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ABSTRACT 
  For thirty years, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have relied 
on active judicial case management to combat undue cost and delay. 
The complaints about cost and delay have not gone away, but few 
blame the case-management rules for that. Indeed, lawyers continue 
to view active judicial case management as one of the best ways of 
reducing cost and delay, and most of the reforms being urged today 
seek even greater judicial case management for that reason. But some 
think the rulemakers took a wrong turn thirty years ago and that each 
round of rulemaking that places more reliance on case management 
simply compounds the error. 
  This Article examines the role of case management in the current 
system, the criticisms of the case-management model, and the 
implications of those criticisms for the current reform agenda. It is 
organized around five questions, each exploring a policy or practical 
issue associated with having a pretrial system that (1) has just one set 
of rules for all cases, and (2) relies on active judicial case management 
to ensure that the pretrial process in each case is just, speedy, and 
inexpensive. The stakes are high. If we, participants in the judicial 
system, are to continue to rely on active judicial case management to 
tailor the pretrial process to the needs of individual cases, then we 
must be sure that we understand the implications of doing so. If we 
conclude that we do not like those implications, or that there are better 
ways to tailor the pretrial process, then we need to take a different 
path than the one we have traversed for the last thirty years. But if we 
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conclude that we have been on the right path, and that federal courts 
should push even farther down that path, then we must be prepared to 
meet the crossfire that we will encounter along the way. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Judging changed thirty years ago. That was when everyday 
federal pretrial practice evolved to assimilate the active case-
management approach1 originally developed for use in cases that 
were protracted or complex.2 No longer do federal judges sit back 
 
 1. See E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 306, 308–09 (1986) (describing the development of managerial judging); Richard L. 
Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 
761, 790–91 (1993) (describing the emergence of managerial judging); William W Schwarzer, 
Managing Civil Litigation: The Trial Judge’s Role, 61 JUDICATURE 400, 404 (1978) (describing 
courts’ adoption of procedures under the Manual for Complex Litigation premised on active 
judicial management). 
 2. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of 
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 938–40 (2000) (discussing case management in protracted 
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passively and let the lawyers manage their cases unless and until they 
encounter a problem that requires judicial attention. Rather, federal 
judges now take control of their cases from the start. The process of 
taking control typically begins with the judge issuing a case-
management order that sets a detailed schedule based on the 
particular needs of the case. As the case goes forward, the federal 
judge can continue to exercise control by, among other things, closely 
managing the scope, timing, and sequence of discovery and 
dispositive motions.3 Starting in 1983 and continuing into the present 
era, a series of amendments have enshrined active judicial case 
management into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Civil Rules), 
formally validating it as a favored practice while encouraging and 
 
cases); see also WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
237–41 (1968) (discussing the emerging philosophy of having a single judge assigned to 
“troublesome” cases with the expectation that the judge would then actively manage the case to 
expedite the litigation); Study Grp. on Procedure in Protracted Litig., Judicial Conference of the 
U.S., Handbook for Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351, 359 (1960) (“Let it be emphasized this is 
not the ordinary litigation; our subject is rare in number, the truly complicated, a few hundred 
amid the tens of thousands of cases on federal court calendars.”). 
 3. Judicial case management is also closely associated with the expansion of alternative 
dispute resolution processes, particularly the increase in judicial involvement in the settlement 
process. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(I) (“[A]t any pretrial conference, the court may 
consider . . . settling the case and using special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when 
authorized by statute or local rule.”). The Committee Notes to both the 1983 and the 1993 
amendments to Rule 16 sent strong signals to the bench and the bar that alternative dispute 
resolution processes and settlement were a big part of the case management that the expanded 
version of Rule 16 contemplated. See id. advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment; id. 
advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. That aspect of judicial case management has 
drawn some of the harshest criticism. See Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on 
Judicial Power in the Era of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 75 (1995) 
(describing the trend toward and criticism of managerial judging); Judith Resnik, Managerial 
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 424–31 (1982) (discussing the side effects of managerial judging). 
And as a wonderful recent symposium evidences, the debate about the role of settlement (and 
necessarily the role of judges in promoting settlement) continues to this day. See Symposium, 
Against Settlement: Twenty-Five Years Later, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1117 (2009). The focus of 
this Article, however, is on the case-processing aspects of the judicial case-management 
movement. That is to say, it focuses on how judges can manage pretrial activities for the purpose 
of facilitating a trial or other judicial outcome. Admittedly, these different forms of case 
management do not exist in neatly segregated silos. Management activities can lead to a 
settlement even if that was not an express goal. And some management activities—such as 
sequencing discovery or motion practice—can be designed to target threshold issues with the 
idea that resolving them early might lead to an early dispositive ruling or to an early settlement. 
That being said, I leave to others, or to another day, the questions raised when federal judges 
actively and directly seek to resolve cases by settlement or through noncourt dispute-resolution 
processes. 
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enabling it by giving district judges an ever-expanding set of case-
management tools to be used in its pursuit.4 
But even though we are nearly thirty years into the case-
management era, many practical questions about the real-world 
effectiveness of judicial case management remain at least partly 
unanswered. Does judicial case management really work? Does it 
actually reduce expense and delay? Do judges have the right tools at 
their disposal? Do judges have the resources they need? Are judges 
sufficiently and properly using the tools and resources they do have? 
If judges are not using those tools and resources effectively, why is 
that occurring and what can be done to change it? 
These questions are as important today as they have ever been. 
Recent Supreme Court musings about the ability of case management 
to control expense and delay—made in decisions that suggest an 
enhanced gatekeeping role for pleadings—challenge us to reexamine 
the foundations of our system of notice pleading and liberal 
discovery.5 Many groups have risen to that challenge, commissioning 
new empirical work and offering reform proposals of varying scope 
and degrees of boldness.6 This very conference—the 2010 Civil 
Litigation Review Conference, held at Duke University School of 
Law (Duke Conference)—is itself devoted to assessing the 
performance of the existing civil litigation system and exploring 
possible improvements to it.7 In this environment, one cannot 
overstate the importance of fully understanding what case 
management can achieve and how it can be improved. 
But one cannot discuss the effective use of case management in 
isolation. Case management is a part of the larger, interwoven fabric 
 
 4. See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE. L.J. 1, 18–36 (2010) (discussing the effect of heightened 
pleading standards on Rules 12(b)(6) and 56); infra notes 7–24 and accompanying text. 
 5. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“[T]he success of judicial 
supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”). 
 6. This Article references several of these empirical studies. See, e.g., sources cited infra 
notes 77–78 , 80, 104, and 281. 
 7. See Purpose Statement, 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIG., http://
civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/h_RoomHome/4df38292d748069d05256
70800167212/?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 8, 2010); see also Memorandum from Judge 
Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Judge Lee H. 
Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee 1–2, 7–17 (May 17, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2010.pdf (discussing proposals from the 2010 Duke 
Conference on how to manage cost and delay in litigation). 
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of our dispute-resolution system.8 It is inextricably bound up with 
policy debates about the role of judges and with fundamental 
questions about the proper design of pretrial procedure. One 
therefore cannot discuss changes to judicial case management without 
considering how those changes might alter the role of judges or 
whether those changes might conflict with competing norms about 
the proper design of pretrial procedure. Although the list of 
intersecting foundational questions could no doubt be expanded, here 
are five that particularly deserve examination: 
 
1. How should Article III judges be spending their time? 
2. Should there be different rules for different types of 
cases? 
3. Do case-management rules give trial judges too much 
discretion? 
4. Can case management alone adequately control cost and 
delay? 
5. Should judges “manage up” or “manage down”? 
 
This Article proceeds in two parts. In Part I, I briefly sketch the 
role of case management in the current civil pretrial scheme. In 
particular, I hope to show how deeply the federal judiciary is 
committed to the case-management model. That commitment is 
evident not just in the Civil Rules but also in publications issued by 
the United States Judicial Conference and the Federal Judicial 
Center (FJC). Despite the various objections that have been raised 
against active judicial case management, the institutional judiciary’s 
commitment to the case-management model has, if anything, 
increased over time. 
In Part II, I discuss the five questions listed above. Given the 
purpose of the Duke Conference, it is not my aim here to propose 
final answers to those questions. Rather, I examine them to provide 
context for our deliberations about how we might improve upon the 
case-management scheme that already exists. These five questions 
represent existing critiques of the federal court case-management 
 
 8. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 
95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 831 (2010) (summarizing the effect of heightened pleading standards on 
the civil litigation system); Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving Cases “On the Merits,” 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 
407, 407 (2010) (“As with a spider’s web, a tug on a single rule can collapse the entire 
structure.”). 
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scheme. Moreover, they address features or consequences of the case-
management approach generally and are not limited to whether case 
management is effective. Thus, any proposals that would expand or 
enhance case management would continue to be subject to these 
critiques even if it were shown conclusively that the proposal in 
question would in fact improve the trial judge’s ability to manage 
cases. 
Sound case management is the key to the current federal court 
pretrial scheme. Ultimately, I think our best chance for improving the 
scheme is to strive for even better case management. And I fully 
expect that the Duke Conference will stimulate the development of 
many promising suggestions for doing so. That said, we cannot focus 
solely and narrowly on whether the proposals that emerge would 
improve the ability of federal judges to manage their cases. We must, 
at the same time, consider whether those proposals might conflict 
with existing policy choices about the role of judges or with various 
norms about how best to design a civil litigation system. In the end, 
case-management reform is not just a function of finding better or 
more effective case-management techniques. It is also a function of 
navigating the crossfire issuing from these broader-based critiques of 
the case-management model generally. 
I.  CASE MANAGEMENT AND THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
Today, active judicial case management is a defining 
characteristic of the federal civil pretrial scheme. It is no stretch to say 
that active judicial case management has joined the troika of notice 
pleading, liberal discovery, and summary judgment as one of the core 
features of the federal pretrial process. It was not always so—and the 
transition was not without dissent. This Part briefly chronicles the rise 
of active judicial case management in the federal court system. 
Proceeding chronologically, it shows how case management evolved 
from a niche device for dealing with complex and protracted litigation 
to a ubiquitous practice employed across the civil docket. Along the 
way, it describes how the case-management movement gained the 
overwhelming approval of both the bar and the institutional judiciary 
despite opposition from some of the most prominent legal 
commentators of our time. 
At a foundational level, the story of case management in the 
federal courts begins with the shift from the so-called master calendar 
to individual case assignment. For the first several decades of practice 
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under the Civil Rules, cases were put on the master calendar, which 
meant that they were not assigned to any particular judge until they 
were ready for trial. Rather, the judges shared responsibility for 
resolving pretrial matters; when something came up during the 
pretrial process that required the attention of a judge, it would be 
presented to whichever judge was scheduled to perform the type of 
activity required.9 But beginning in the late 1960s, most federal 
district courts switched to the single-assignment model, in which 
every case is assigned to a particular judge for the life of the suit.10 
The advent of active case management and the switch to single 
assignment went hand in hand. Case management is about taking 
control. Without having “ownership” of a particular case, the judge 
lacks both the ability and the incentive to exercise control.11 In today’s 
federal judicial world, where cases are assigned to individual judges 
(and where the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts keeps 
 
 9. See Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case 
Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 253, 257 (1985); Peterson, supra note 3, at 68–69; see also MAUREEN SOLOMON & 
DOUGLAS K. SOMERLOT, AM. BAR ASS’N, CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT IN THE TRIAL COURT: 
NOW AND FOR THE FUTURE 33–44 (1987) (discussing the different types of assignment systems 
in detail). 
 10. See Peckham, supra note 9, at 257. 
 11. The English experience with case management seems to bear this point out. Prompted 
by the Woolf Report, England and Wales adopted new Civil Practice Rules that explicitly 
heralded a transition from a passive judicial role to a role of active case management. See 
Anthony Clarke, The Woolf Reforms: A Singular Event or an Ongoing Process?, in THE CIVIL 
PROCEDURE RULES TEN YEARS ON 33, 43 (Deirdre Dwyer ed., 2009); Robert Turner, 
“Actively”: The Word that Changed the Civil Courts, in THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES TEN 
YEARS ON, supra, at 82–84. Although many of the Woolf Reforms are viewed as a success, 
there appears to be general agreement that English judges have not embraced active case 
management. One cause appears to be the lack of a single-assignment system in England. See 
Adrian Zuckerman, Litigation Management Under the CPR: A Poorly-Used Management 
Infrastructure, in THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES TEN YEARS ON, supra, at 105. As Professor 
Zuckerman puts it, “No single judge has a personal interest in bringing the dispute to a 
successful conclusion with the greatest practicable efficiency.” Id. Lord Justice Rupert Jackson 
reached the same conclusion in his report on litigation costs, leading him to recommend that all 
cases in the “multi-track” (England’s general track for cases above £25,000) be assigned to a 
single judge throughout the life of the case. LORD JUSTICE RUPERT JACKSON, REVIEW OF 
CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS: FINAL REPORT 393 (2009). On this side of the Atlantic, reform 
groups continue to call for single assignment in those state systems that still do not have it, 
though the emphasis is more on the benefits of continuity. See, e.g., INST. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 21ST CENTURY CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A ROADMAP 
FOR REFORM: CIVIL CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES 8 (2009) (“A single judge should 
be assigned to each case at the beginning of the litigation and should stay with the case through 
its disposition.”). 
GENSLER IN PRINTER PROOF 11/29/2010  7:00:19 PM 
676 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 60:669 
statistics on each judge’s docket12), judges have a strong incentive to 
find ways to take control of and manage the cases that appear on 
their individual dockets.13 
If one is looking for a turning point in the history of judicial case 
management in the federal courts, though, it would be 1983 and the 
amendments to Rule 16 and Rule 26 that took effect that year. For 
several decades before then, the trend in discovery rulemaking was 
toward changes that reduced judicial oversight and involvement. A 
particularly notable example is the 1970 change to Rule 34 that 
eliminated the need for parties to seek leave of court and show good 
cause in order to serve document requests.14 A less obvious example, 
also from 1970, is the change to Rule 33 that made objections suffice 
as a response to interrogatories and put the burden on the party 
seeking answers to challenge the objections.15 In both cases, the intent 
of the change was to reduce court intervention and have the rule 
operate extrajudicially.16 
 
 12. See 28 U.S.C. § 476(a) (2006) (requiring the Administrative Office to publish reports 
disclosing for each judge the number of motions that have been pending for more than six 
months and the number of cases that have not been terminated within three years). These 
reporting requirements originated as part of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified in part at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2006)); see R. Lawrence Dessem, Judicial Reporting Under the Civil Justice 
Reform Act: Look, Mom, No Cases!, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 687, 688 (1993) (noting that the Civil 
Justice Reform Act could have a significant impact upon civil cases in federal courts). Though 
the reporting requirements were initially set to sunset after seven years, Congress made them 
permanent in 1997. Act of Oct. 6, 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-53, § 2, 111 Stat. 1173, 1173 (codified at 
28 U.S.C. § 471 note). 
 13. Peckham, supra note 9, at 257; see also 1 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., WORKING PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 48 (1990), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/fcscvol1.pdf/$file/fcscvol1.pdf (“Individual calendaring 
increases a judge’s sense of control and responsibility for a case. More important, individual 
calendaring makes it possible to track each judge’s disposition rates . . . .”); STEVEN FLANDERS, 
FED. JUDICIAL CTR., FJC-R-77-6-1, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 13–14 (1977) (recounting one judge’s statement that “[t]he 
individual calendar system . . . is superb in fostering personal motivation”). 
 14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 & advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment. The original 
discovery rules also required leave of court to take depositions and to serve interrogatories after 
the first set. Both of those restrictions were eliminated in 1946. See id. 30 & advisory 
committee’s note to 1946 amendment; id. 33 & advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment. 
As of 2009, only Rule 35 (Physical and Mental Examinations) requires a court order to compel 
compliance. See id. 35(a) (“The court where action is pending may order a party whose mental 
or physical condition—including blood group—is in controversy to submit to a physical or 
mental examination . . . .”). 
 15. See id. 33 & advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment. 
 16. See id. advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment (“The mechanics of the 
operation of Rule 33 are substantially revised by the proposed amendment, with a view to 
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The Advisory Committee seemed to reverse course in 1983. The 
word “management” made its first appearance in the Civil Rules.17 
Rule 16 was transformed from a rule principally directed at trial 
preparation18 to one that encouraged—and in some respects 
required—trial court judges to take a hands-on approach to managing 
their cases during the life of the suit.19 Judicial management was 
woven directly into the discovery process when the rulemakers 
amended Rule 26(b) to require judges to limit redundant and 
disproportionate discovery.20 As Professor Arthur Miller, then the 
Reporter to the Advisory Committee, colorfully put it, the 1983 
amendment to Rule 26(b) “sold the judges into slavery” by using 
active case management to curtail discovery abuse.21 
The case-management provisions of the 1983 amendments were 
central to the Advisory Committee’s plan for combating excessive 
 
reducing court intervention.”); id. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment (“The 
revision of Rule 34 to have it operate extrajudicially, rather than by court order, is to a large 
extent a reflection of existing law practice.”). 
 17. Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their 
Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2199 (1989). 
 18. See Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional 
Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133, 159 (1997) 
(describing the original pretrial focus of Rule 16); Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure 
to How Lawyers Litigate: ’Twixt the Cup and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 234 (2010) 
(noting that Rule 16’s original title focused on pretrial procedure); David L. Shapiro, Federal 
Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1978–81 
(1989) (describing the limitations of early attempts to encourage judicial case management). 
 19. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“Given the 
significant changes in federal civil litigation since 1938 that are not reflected in Rule 16, it has 
been extensively rewritten and expanded to meet the challenges of modern litigation.”); id. 
(“The amended rule makes scheduling and case management an express goal of pretrial 
procedure.”); see also id. 16. See generally Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Towards Discretion, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1588 (2003) (“Beginning in 1983, Rule 16 was amended to require 
case management activity by all judges in most cases, and to encourage more managerial activity 
than was required.” (emphasis added)); Shapiro, supra note 18, at 1984–87 (describing the 
purposes of the 1983 amendment of Rule 16); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, The Managerial Judge 
Goes to Trial, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1261, 1268 (2010) (stating that amendments to Rule 16 “have 
not only blessed judicial management, but also made judicial management a requirement in 
almost every case”). 
 20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) & advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment 
(establishing limits on discovery); see also ARTHUR R. MILLER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE 
AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING 
EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 30–36 (1984) (discussing the 
purpose behind the 1983 amendments). 
 21. MILLER, supra note 20, at 32. 
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cost and delay.22 As Professor Miller explains, the “Committee 
consciously chose to concentrate on the pretrial phase as the best 
hope for meaningfully attacking [the] cost and delay [problems].”23 
The Committee was following the lead of prominent judges who 
already had been urging their colleagues on the bench to use case-
management techniques to pare their cases to what was really at stake 
and to guide the parties toward faster and less-expensive resolutions.24 
Not everyone jumped on the bandwagon. Various critics voiced 
policy objections to judicial case management. The leading critic is 
Professor Judith Resnik. She questions whether the new model of 
“managerial judging” is too susceptible to abuse because the case-
management activities being advocated tend to be less formal, less 
visible, and more discretionary than the traditional judicial activities 
of holding hearings, deciding motions, and conducting trials.25 
According to Professor Resnik’s critique, active case management 
creates a heightened risk that judges would exert activist or 
ideological pressures in ways that would elude appellate oversight.26 
More simply stated, the concern is that judges, through unreviewable 
case-management techniques, could help parties or positions they 
favor and impede parties or positions they disfavor. At a more 
pragmatic level, Professor Resnik also questions whether case 
 
 22. The 1983 amendments were not directed solely at judicial management; some 
provisions were directed at lawyers’ behavior. Rule 11 was overhauled in 1983, ratcheting up the 
standard and making sanctions mandatory when a violation occurred. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 
advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. Rule 26(g) was added at the same time. It 
requires lawyers to sign discovery requests, responses, and objections certifying that they are 
consistent with the rules, not interposed for any improper purpose, and neither unreasonable 
nor unduly burdensome or expensive. See id. 26(g). The Rule 26(g) certification requirement 
was designed to make lawyers stop and think about the legitimacy and reasonableness of their 
discovery requests, responses, and objections before serving them. See id. 26(g) advisory 
committee’s note to 1983 amendment. The hope was that the more exacting version of Rule 11 
and the new duties under Rule 26(g) would curb cost and delay by leading lawyers to act more 
responsibly. See Richard L. Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of 
the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363, 364 
(1983) (“Their basic thrust is to remedy problems of expense and delay . . . .”). 
 23. Miller, supra note 4, at 55. 
 24. MILLER, supra note 20, at 20–21 (“In a real sense, rule 16 as rewritten, for all of its 
subclasses, doesn’t say anything new. It is a synthesis of what is existing practice for many, many 
district judges in the United States.”); see also Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case 
Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 
772 (1981) (discussing a judge’s role in the pretrial phase); Schwarzer, supra note 1, at 408 
(“Judicial intervention will help ensure that controversies will be litigated in a manner 
appropriate to what is truly at issue, and as justly, speedily and inexpensively as possible.”). 
 25. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 424–31 (discussing the side effects of managerial judging). 
 26. Id. 
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management, which had been advanced as a tonic for undue expense 
and delay, really did reduce cost or speed up the process.27 As 
discussed more fully below, other commentators share these doubts 
and concerns.28 Perhaps the most influential of them is Judge Frank 
Easterbrook, who, in a widely cited article, argues that case 
management cannot work as intended because the judges do not have 
the information they need to manage effectively.29 
Despite these objections, case management became an even 
greater part of modern federal civil practice in the years that 
followed. Several rounds of amendments to the Civil Rules expanded 
the trial court’s case-management role.30 The next big year for case-
management rule changes was 1993. In that year, Rule 16 was 
amended again to further cement and enlarge the trial court’s case-
management authority.31 Rule 26(b) was amended again as well that 
year, conferring on trial courts even broader discretion to manage 
discovery.32 Another 1993 change with major implications for case 
management was the amendment to Rule 26(f) making the discovery-
planning conference a mandatory event.33 The animating purpose of 
that amendment was to facilitate judicial case management by 
providing meaningful inputs for the court to consider at the Rule 16 
stage.34 Even Rule 1 was amended to embrace the emerging case-
management ethos, with the rule now providing that the Civil Rules 
“should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”35 The 
purpose of the revision was “to recognize the affirmative duty of the 
 
 27. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges and Court Delay: The Unproven Assumptions, 23 
JUDGES J., Winter 1984, at 8, 10–11 (“Little empirical evidence exists to support the claim that 
judicial management works.”); see also infra notes 87–89, 226–27 and accompanying text. 
 28. See infra notes 223–36 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638–39 (1989). 
 30. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules—And the 
Extent of Convergence with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 200–02 (2007) (listing 
amendments to the case-management rules through the 2006 electronic discovery amendments). 
 31. FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
 32. Id. 26(b) & advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
 33. Id. 26(f) & advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
 34. See Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s E-volving Duties in Discovery, 
36 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 529 (2009) [hereinafter Gensler, E-volving Duties]. Increasingly, the Rule 
26(f) conference is being viewed as a platform for the parties to reach agreement on discovery 
issues, especially those involving electronic discovery. See Steven S. Gensler, A Bull’s-Eye View 
of Cooperation in Discovery, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 363, 367 (Supp. 2009) [hereinafter Gensler, 
Bull’s-Eye View]. 
 35. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added). 
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court to exercise the authority conferred by these rules to ensure that 
civil litigation is resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost 
or delay.”36 
Even Congress took up the cause in the 1990s. Reduction of 
expense and delay was a central theme of the oft-maligned Civil 
Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA),37 which ordered the federal 
judiciary to experiment with a set of case-management techniques.38 
The federal judiciary carried out its statutory responsibilities under 
the CJRA dutifully, though perhaps at times a bit grudgingly.39 
Although not all of the components of the CJRA were received with 
eager enthusiasm,40 the judiciary embraced the CJRA’s main premise 
of using case management to reduce expense and delay. In its Final 
Report to Congress on the CJRA, the Judicial Conference endorsed 
early case management as provided in Rule 16, saying that “[t]he 
federal judiciary is committed to, and believes in, sound case 
management to reduce unnecessary cost and delay in civil 
litigation.”41 
By the mid-1990s, active judicial case management had been a 
central feature of federal pretrial practice for over a decade. Yet cost 
and delay—concerns that case management was intended to 
address—still existed, and may have grown worse, raising again the 
question of whether the purported benefits of case management were 
 
 36. Id. advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
 37. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA), Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089 
(codified in part at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2006)). 
 38. Id. tit. I, 104 Stat. at 5089–98. 
 39. See JAMES S. KAKALIK, TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL A. HILL, DANIEL 
MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, RAND INST. FOR 
CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM ACT, at xxi (1996) (finding that although all of the pilot districts technically 
complied with the CJRA, they sometimes did not engage in the spirit of experimentation 
contemplated by the act and often let implementation fall short). Congress passed the CJRA 
despite strong opposition from the federal judiciary. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Paradise Lost, 
Paradigm Found: Redefining the Judiciary’s Imperiled Role in Congress, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1165, 1190 (1996) (discussing the social and economic consequences of judicial rulemaking); 
Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 
1601–02 (1994) (discussing judges’ fear of Congressional micromanagement in the CJRA). 
 40. See Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and 
When?, 49 ALA. L. REV. 221, 235–39 (1997) (noting the RAND Report’s findings that many of 
the CJRA principles and techniques were eschewed or halfheartedly implemented and 
speculating that some of the failure of the CJRA may be attributable to the fact that the federal 
judges who were implementing the CJRA were not always committed to the enterprise). 
 41. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990: 
FINAL REPORT 10 (1997) (noting the judiciary’s commitment to case management). 
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real. In response, a first wave of empirical studies from 1997 
attempted to determine whether case-management techniques really 
do reduce expense and delay. The results from these studies have 
been called inconclusive.42 A study by the RAND Institute suggested 
that early case management might actually increase costs unless the 
court also imposes a shortened period for discovery.43 A follow-up 
report by RAND massaged the point, concluding that, although early 
case management does increase costs up front, it pays dividends later 
so long as the court requires the parties to develop and submit a 
discovery plan.44 
The empirical studies of that era, however, showed one thing 
clearly: that lawyers were convinced of the net benefits of judicial case 
management.45 In its 1998 study, the FJC found that lawyers strongly 
believed that additional attention from the judge—via availability to 
rule on discovery disputes or through discovery management 
generally—would reduce the expense of discovery.46 Moreover, when 
asked what reform they thought held the most promise for reducing 
discovery problems, their “clear choice [was] increased judicial case 
management.”47 
Perhaps bolstered—but at least not deterred—by these findings, 
the rulemakers continued to employ judicial case management as a 
primary tool in the quest to control cost and delay, especially in 
discovery. In 2000, the reference point for the scope of discovery was 
 
 42. See Rowe, supra note 30, at 193 (“[T]he limited empirical evidence on managerial 
judging’s effectiveness at reducing delay and cost . . . remains . . . fairly inconclusive.”); Roselle 
L. Wissler & Bob Dauber, Leading Horses to Water: The Impact of an ADR “Confer and 
Report” Rule, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 253, 269 (2005) (summarizing the findings of other studies). 
 43. KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 39, at 54–57. 
 44. James S. Kakalik, Deborah R. Hensler, Daniel McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas M. 
Pace & Mary E. Vaiana, RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Discovery Management: Further Analysis 
of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 652–54 (1998). Perhaps the 
most significant contribution of the RAND data in this regard is to highlight a pervasive risk 
when adopting rule reforms that front-load effort and expense to the beginning of the case, 
which is that front-loading can cause an increase in overall expense if taken too far. See 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 41, at 45–46; Gensler, E-volving Duties, supra 
note 34, at 536–38. Although I do not think the current system has passed that tipping point, it is 
a concern that we must make sure does not slip off the radar screen. 
 45. The bar’s demand for case management goes back even further. See Steven Flanders, 
Blind Umpires—A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 519–20 (1984). 
 46. Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean Miletich, An Empirical 
Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. 
REV. 525, 584–87 (1998). 
 47. Id. at 588. 
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narrowed slightly. Previously, parties could take discovery of matters 
that were relevant to “the subject matter” of the suit; under the 
amended rule, relevance was anchored to the parties’ “claims or 
defenses,” though the court could expand the scope of discovery back 
to “subject matter” relevance for good cause.48 At the same time, a 
redundant cross-reference to the limits set forth in Rule 26(b)(2) was 
added to the end of Rule 26(b)(1).49 On the surface, these changes 
seem targeted at narrowing discovery. But as the accompanying 
Committee Note explains, their actual purpose was to promote more 
active case management: 
The amendment is designed to involve the court more actively in 
regulating the breadth of sweeping or contentious discovery. The 
Committee has been informed repeatedly by lawyers that 
involvement of the court in managing discovery is an important 
method of controlling problems of inappropriately broad discovery. 
Increasing the availability of judicial officers to resolve discovery 
disputes and increasing court management of discovery were both 
strongly endorsed by the attorneys surveyed by the Federal Judicial 
Center.50 
Finally, case management has taken a central place in discovery 
reforms aimed at the problems associated with electronic discovery 
(e-discovery). The 2006 e-discovery amendments rely heavily on 
judicial case management.51 In general, the e-discovery amendments 
eschew specific requirements or limits, opting instead to create 
mechanisms designed to flag issues for the parties so they can either 
resolve them privately or present them to the court early in the case. 
The most concrete example lies in the way the new Rule 34(b) 
provisions address the often sticky question of whether parties should 
produce electronically stored information (ESI) in its native 
electronic file format or in some other format, like a hard-copy 
 
 48. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) & advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. See 
generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on the 
Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 16–18 (2001) (detailing “the two-tier 
approach retaining subject-matter discovery upon court order granted for good cause”). 
 49. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) & advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. 
 50. Id. advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. 
 51. See Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 238 (“The 2006 rule amendments continued the trends 
toward requiring the parties and their lawyers to raise problems early, to try to reach 
agreement, and to facilitate judicial involvement and supervision when needed. The 
amendments, and more importantly, the features of electronic discovery that made the 
amendments necessary in the first place, highlighted the importance of judicial involvement in 
managing discovery.”). 
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printout or an electronic image file (for example, a TIFF image or a 
PDF file). Rather than dictate any particular form of production, the 
amended rule instead contains several provisions designed to smoke 
out potential problems before production occurs.52 At a more general 
level, changes to Rule 26(f) direct the parties to discuss various e-
discovery issues with an eye toward resolving those issues up front, 
either with or without the court’s assistance.53 Complementary 
changes to Rule 16 add e-discovery to the list of items to be 
considered during the case-management conference and addressed in 
the case-management order.54 The recently-enacted Federal Rule of 
Evidence 502 continues the case-management theme. By explicitly 
providing that court orders regarding waiver are binding in other 
courts and in cases involving other litigants,55 it creates an added 
incentive for parties to work with the judge to craft creative methods 
for reducing the cost and delay associated with e-discovery.56 
Over the past thirty years, the federal judiciary’s commitment to 
case management has also manifested itself in the policies and 
practices promoted by the institutional arms of the federal judiciary. 
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee gave strong support to 
active case management, stating, “We endorse the trend toward more 
vigorous case management by district judges.”57 In 1995, the Long 
Range Plan of the Federal Courts58 recommended that “[t]he district 
courts should enhance efforts to manage cases effectively.”59 Both the 
Federal Courts Study and the Long Range Plan stressed the 
 
 52. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C) (permitting the requesting party to specify the form or 
forms in which ESI is to be produced); id. 34(b)(2)(D) (permitting the responding party to 
object to the requested form and, if not producing ESI in a requested form, state the form or 
forms it intends to produce). 
 53. See id. 26(f); advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment (“When the parties do 
anticipate disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information, discussion at the outset 
may avoid later difficulties or ease their resolution.”). 
 54. See id. 16(b)(3)(B) & advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment; id. 16(c)(2). 
 55. FED. R. EVID. 502(d). 
 56. See Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 238 (“[Rule 502] provides an additional incentive for 
parties to seek—and for courts to provide—early involvement to set the terms and limits 
governing discovery.”). 
 57. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 
100 (1990). 
 58. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 
(1995). 
 59. Id. at 70. 
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importance of educating judges in case management.60 Indeed, the 
Long Range Plan went so far as to say, “In the future, large dockets 
will test the management abilities of even the best judges. Intensive 
case management training will be essential.”61 Not surprisingly, 
judicial education programs have regularly promoted the benefits of 
case management and offered tips for effective management.62 
The ascendance of the case-management model during this 
period also can be seen in the publications that the institutional arms 
of the federal judiciary wrote for federal judges. As late as 1977, a 
study published by the FJC urged judges to take early control by 
setting firm deadlines but to otherwise minimize the amount of time 
they invested in their cases until discovery was complete.63 By the 
time of the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 and Rule 26, however, 
judges were being told that time spent in active management of 
discovery would pay rich dividends later.64 In 1991, the FJC published 
a pamphlet titled The Elements of Case Management.65 Invoking the 
goal of achieving the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” administration 
of justice set forth in Rule 1, the pamphlet begins by stating that “[i]f 
judges are to achieve this goal in the face of scarce judicial resources 
and the rising cost of litigation, they must manage the litigation 
process.”66 And that includes managing discovery.67 
 
 60. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 57, at 100 (“The growing importance of 
case management techniques calls for even more judicial education about the range and 
implementation of such techniques to eliminate unnecessary cost and delay while maintaining 
judicial impartiality.”); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 58, at 71 
(recommending that “[t]he Federal Judicial Center should continue to sponsor the requisite 
training and education for judges”). 
 61. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 58, at 110. 
 62. See Resnik, supra note 2, at 948–49 (noting that, as early as 1971, judges teaching 
seminars for new judges “favored and taught active judicial involvement in settling cases”); see 
also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 41, at 21 (noting the judiciary’s 
“longstanding commitment to judicial and staff education in case management” and 
recommending that it be extended to the entire legal community). 
 63. See FLANDERS, supra note 13, at 17 (“To handle its case load efficiently, a court must 
minimize the time judges spend on the initial stages of their cases and require lawyers 
themselves to resolve the relatively petty disputes (especially discovery questions) in most 
instances.”). 
 64. MILLER, supra note 20, at 34–36 (“Yes, judge, spend the time [managing discovery] up 
front, and we believe it will save you double time or triple time down the line.”). 
 65. WILLIAM W SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE ELEMENTS OF 
CASE MANAGEMENT (1991). 
 66. Id. at 1. 
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Today, the message from the institutional federal judiciary 
regarding case management is unambiguously positive.68 The Civil 
Litigation Management Manual,69 published by the U.S. Judicial 
Conference in 2001, advises that “[e]stablishing early control over the 
pretrial process is pivotal in controlling litigation cost and delay.”70 
The Civil Litigation Management Manual later advises trial judges 
about the importance of the Rule 16 conference: 
The Rule 16 conference is generally the first point of significant 
contact for establishing case management control. You have an 
unparalleled opportunity to set the pace and scope of all case 
activities that follow, to look the lawyers and litigants in the eye, and 
to set the tone of the case.71 
In 2006, the FJC published a second edition of The Elements of Case 
Management, this time adding to the title the phrase A Pocket Guide 
for Judges.72 Like the first edition of the pamphlet, the second edition 
minces no words about the ability of case management to save time 
and expense: 
A small amount of a judge’s time devoted to case management early 
in a case can save vast amounts of time later on. Saving time also 
means saving costs, both for the court and for the litigants. Judges 
who think they are too busy to manage cases are really too busy not 
to. Indeed, the busiest judges with the heaviest dockets are often the 
ones most in need of sound case-management practices.73  
 
 67. See id. at 11 (“[The power granted under Rule 26] ought to be used to prevent 
duplication, to require lawyers to use the least expensive way to get necessary information, and 
to keep discovery costs from becoming disproportionate to what is at stake in the lawsuit.”). 
 68. As one observer puts it, “The Judicial Conference of the United States, the 
policymaking body for the administration of the federal courts, promotes a legal culture that 
encourages judges to actively manage litigation as early and as much as necessary.” John Lande, 
The Movement Toward Early Case Handling in Courts and Private Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 81, 90 (2008). 
 69. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL (2001). 
 70. Id. at 5. 
 71. Id. at 14. 
 72. WILLIAM W SCHWARZER & ALAN HIRSCH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE ELEMENTS OF 
CASE MANAGEMENT: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES (2d ed. 2006). 
 73. Id. at 1. Nearly identical sentiments appeared in the first edition of that publication. See 
SCHWARZER & HIRSCH, supra note 65, at 1(“Discovery is probably the single greatest source of 
cost and delay in civil litigation, but judges can do much to mitigate this problem.”). Another 
prominent advocate of case management, Judge Charles Richey, echoed those sentiments in his 
writings. See Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revisited: Reflections for the Benefit of Bench and Bar, 
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At the individual-judge level, some of the most prominent 
federal judges of our day remain ardent supporters of judicial case 
management. District Judge Lee Rosenthal, former Chair of the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and current Chair of the 
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, recently 
canvassed the many benefits of judicial case management and 
explored ways to improve the effective application of the existing 
case-management rules.74 In his contribution to the Duke Conference, 
Magistrate Judge Paul Grimm (a current member of the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules) and Elizabeth Cabraser similarly urge that 
we make a renewed commitment to better using the existing case-
management rules before turning to more radical structural changes.75 
And in his contribution to the Duke Conference, District Judge 
Michael Baylson (also a current member of the Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules) adopts a theme of “missed opportunity” as he 
explores various shortcomings in how trial judges are currently using 
the existing case-management provisions.76 
 
139 F.R.D. 525, 527 (1992) (“[D]evoting a small amount of time to early case management can 
save a great deal of time as the case proceeds. The judges who believe they do not have time to 
manage their cases are, in fact, too busy not to manage them.”). 
  The federal court system is not alone in its enthusiasm for case management. In 1999, 
the new Civil Procedure Rules in England that grew out of the Woolf Report embraced case 
management as a means of controlling cost and delay. See CPR, (2006) pt. 1.4(1) (U.K.) (“The 
court must further the overriding objective [of dealing with cases justly] by actively managing 
cases.”). The recent report on litigation costs by Lord Justice Jackson suggests that English civil 
procedure will move even further toward case management as a means of controlling expense 
and delay. See JACKSON, supra note 11, at 394 (“All the feedback which I have received during 
the Costs Review indicates that (despite academic scepticism) both costs and time are saved by 
good case management. By good case management, I mean that a judge of relevant expertise 
takes a grip on the case, identifies the issues and gives directions which are focused upon the 
early resolution of those issues.”). 
 74. See Rosenthal, supra note 18. 
 75. See Paul W. Grimm & Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The State of Discovery Practice in Civil 
Cases: Must the Rules Be Changed to Reduce Costs and Burdens, or Can Significant 
Improvements Be Achieved Within the Existing Rules? 32 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/47D6E0
CDEF6484DA852576EA004A9FDA/$File/Judge Grimm, The State of Discovery Practice in 
Civil Cases.pdf (“The existing Rules of Civil Procedure . . . are a rich source of principled and 
cost-effective guidelines for improved case management, which have yet to be fully explored, 
appreciated, and utilized in civil litigation.”). 
 76. See Michael M. Baylson, Are Civil Jury Trials Going the Way of the Dodo? Has 
Excessive Discovery Led to Settlement as an Economic and Cultural Imperative: A Response to 
Judge Higginbotham and Judge Hornby 14–22 (Apr. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/D0222A
472558384D8525768D00588265/$File/Judge Baylson, Are Civil Jury Trials Going the Way of
the Dodo.pdf (“Judge Higginbotham bemoans the lack of personal appearances before a district 
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Is all that confidence in the benefits of judicial case management 
warranted? A second wave of empirical studies on discovery and case 
management has attempted to provide some answers. Though I do 
not intend to thoroughly canvass or analyze the new data—the 
sources of that data addressed the Duke Conference directly—I think 
it fair to say that the results this time around are more consistently 
and convincingly encouraging. The FJC Survey respondents seemed 
rather content with the current case-management scheme, wanting 
neither more nor less case management.77 The American Bar 
Association (ABA) Section of Litigation Survey respondents 
overwhelmingly agreed that early intervention by judges helps to 
narrow the issues and control discovery.78 The ABA Survey also 
reported that client satisfaction increased when the judge was actively 
involved in managing the case.79 The joint survey by the Institute for 
the Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS) and the 
American College of Trial Lawyers (ACTL) showed similarly strong 
support for active judicial case management among its respondents.80 
Any doubts about the bar’s craving for case management were erased 
at the Duke Conference itself. In reporting on the Conference, Judge 
Mark Kravitz, the current Chair of the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules, remarked, “Pleas for universalized case management achieved 
virtual, perhaps absolute, unanimity.”81 
Of course, lawyer satisfaction does not prove that case 
management is working any more than Judge Easterbrook’s 
skepticism proves that it is not. Nonetheless, the fact that lawyers 
across the board remain convinced of the benefits of active case 
management is well worth noting. If the federal civil litigation scheme 
 
judge, the long time taken for briefing and then ruling on summary judgment, the lack of oral 
argument on motions, as well as the dearth of trials. These all reflect missed opportunities.”). 
 77. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-
BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 67–68 (2009), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf. 
 78. ABA SECTION OF LITIG., MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT 
124–25 (2009). 
 79. Id. at 126. 
 80. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL 
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 18–19 (2009), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm
?Section=Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4053. 
 81. Memorandum from Judge Kravitz to Judge Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 8. 
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is to continue to rely on judicial case management, support from the 
bar is important, and perhaps critically so. The case-management 
model probably could not work, and certainly could not work very 
well, if lawyers and litigants overwhelmingly disliked or distrusted it. 
Case management works best when judges and parties pursue it 
willingly and in the spirit of joint enterprise. That does not mean that 
all lawyers will like the case-management decisions they get in 
individual cases. But what matters is that lawyers generally support 
the pursuit of case management ex ante. If lawyers resisted the idea of 
case management, chafing against it even before they knew the 
outcome, it would produce an intolerable friction. 
All things considered, the recent survey data give welcome cause 
for hope that the path we have pursued for the last thirty years has 
not been one giant misstep and may even have been the right step. 
Future analysis of those data may also provide sound direction for 
any next step. 
II.  THE CROSSFIRE 
For now, let us assume that we can improve judicial case 
management. Let us assume that, with the renewed commitment 
urged by Judge Rosenthal and Judge Grimm, and with Judge 
Baylson’s eye toward capitalizing on existing opportunities, we can 
improve our usage of the existing case-management tools.82 Let us 
further assume that, though the quiver is already well-stocked, we can 
add even more “managerial arrows”83 when the need is shown. In 
short, let us assume—and I think the assumption is a safe one—that 
we have not yet perfected the case-management scheme we first 
started experimenting with in 1983. 
A discussion that focused solely on perfecting the 1983 vision of 
judicial case management would be well worth having. But any such 
discussion would be incomplete. Case management is not a self-
contained concept. Nor does it exist in a vacuum. The question of 
 
 82. To cite just one example, Judge Rosenthal explains in detail all that could be 
accomplished if judges conducted live scheduling conferences, in person, with the lawyers in 
attendance. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 241. When judges hold perfunctory Rule 16 
conferences, or do not hold them at all, there can be no genuine exchange about the needs of 
the case, no inquiry into whether the parties have taken the appropriate planning steps, and no 
meaningful opportunity to identify and focus on the issues that are the most critical to resolving 
the case. Id. (listing the benefits of active judicial involvement). 
 83. Rowe, supra note 30, at 196. 
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case management is inextricably intertwined with our vision of what 
judging should be and with our beliefs about how the rules of 
procedure should be structured. Any reforms that seek to improve 
upon the judicial case-management model cannot help but send 
ripples back toward those larger policy questions. 
The connection between case management and these 
foundational questions of system design is amplified when the reform 
comes from the other direction. The 1983 model of judicial case 
management assumes a particular role for judges and is built on 
features of the civil pretrial system—most notably, having a single set 
of rules for all cases and relying on judicial discretion to tailor the 
procedure to the case—that are a legacy from 1938. The five 
questions introduced earlier and explored herein highlight differing 
views about the proper role of judges and challenge our continued 
fidelity to those legacy features of the current structure of the Civil 
Rules. Any significant changes to the role that we ask judges to play, 
or to the general design of the Civil Rules, would have seismic 
implications for case management. In other words, the type and 
degree of case management that we ask of judges greatly depend on 
the choices we make about the role of judges and the design of our 
system of procedure. Thus, were we to make fundamental changes to 
the system, those changes would not send mere ripples back to case 
management; they would send a tsunami. 
In this Part, I examine five policy and design questions. Many of 
these questions run together, both with each other and with what I 
have carved out as the core “efficacy” question of case management. 
Some of the same general issues pop up in several of the questions. 
Nevertheless, I think there is value in framing these questions 
separately because those general issues often take on a different hue 
when examined in a different light. Moreover, tweaking a case-
management issue to alleviate concerns associated with one of those 
questions may exacerbate concerns raised by another. To return to 
the metaphor of this Article’s title, in the heat of battle it is rarely 
enough simply to know that you are being fired at. Survival may 
depend on clearly identifying all sources of fire, lest an effort to repel 
one source exposes your back to another. 
A. How Should Article III Judges Be Spending Their Time? 
This Section addresses a threshold issue that has divided judges 
and scholars since the inception of the case-management movement: 
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even if case management is an effective technique, is it something that 
judges—and, in particular, Article III judges—should be doing? Or is 
it a nonjudicial task that erodes the true adjudicative role of the judge 
while vesting district judges with management powers that can be 
abused in ways that are hidden from view and unreviewable? This 
Section also addresses the extent to which, in the federal court 
system, we can address those concerns by delegating case 
management to non–Article III magistrate judges. 
For as long as we have had a culture of judicial case 
management, we have also had critics of that culture.84 One criticism 
is that case management is simply a misuse of the Article III judiciary. 
According to this view, when Article III judges spend their time 
managing cases, they are not spending their time doing what Article 
III judges were meant to do—trying cases. This theme was prevalent 
in (though not the animating force behind) much of the recent 
discussion about vanishing trials.85 It is also strongly evident in the 
writings of Judge Patrick Higginbotham, who laments that the case-
management model has so removed the trial judge from the 
courtroom that “we are witnessing the death of an institution whose 
structure is as old as the Republic.”86 Professor Resnik worries that 
“[t]he charge to judges to manage cases competes with and 
marginalizes the charter to adjudicate,” ultimately depriving the 
public of the contributions that public adjudication makes to a 
functioning democracy.87 In earlier work, these and other concerns led 
 
 84. We have also had staunch defenders of case management. For one well-known defense, 
see Flanders, supra note 45. 
 85. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1274 (2005) (“[I]f we want a legal system in which judges and juries 
devise public standards and assess accountability, particularly that of powerful actors, we need 
enough trials to do that job.”) [hereinafter Galanter, Hundred-Year Decline]; see also Marc 
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and 
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); Patricia Lee Refo, The Vanishing Trial, 
LITIGATION, Winter 2004, at 1. 
 86. Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60 
DUKE L.J. 745, 747 (2010). To be precise, Judge Higginbotham’s criticism is not that Article III 
judges should allow their cases to grow, unpruned, according to the whims and extravagances of 
the litigants. He believes that judges can and should manage discovery. But he believes that they 
should do so as a means of pushing the case cheaply and quickly toward trial, and not for the 
purpose of disposing of the case during the pretrial phase. See id. at 763 (“[T]he principal work 
of a district court is to try cases and to offer litigants the opportunity for a reasonably prompt 
and impartial trial.”). 
 87. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, Jeremy Bentham and the Privatization of 
Adjudication, 49 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2D 205, 211–12 (2010). 
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Professor Resnik to suggest that the case-manager model so distorts 
the role of the judge as to undermine the basis for job and salary 
protection.88 Professor Stephen Subrin offers this sobering 
assessment: “A totally unconstrained adjudication system requires 
judges to become what they became: managers. This is not what it 
meant to be a wise judge for the past three millenni[a].”89 
A different criticism of the case-management model relates to 
judicial power and its abuse.90 Professor Resnik has famously 
criticized the case-management model as a potentially new and 
dangerous form of judicial activism. According to this critique, 
“because managerial judging is less visible and usually unreviewable, 
it gives trial courts more authority and at the same time provides 
litigants with fewer procedural safeguards to protect them from abuse 
of that authority.”91 Professor Subrin has expressed similar concerns 
about the power that federal judges wield via the largely discretionary 
rules governing case management.92 Professor Paul Carrington, who 
once served as the Reporter to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, 
made this observation: “The hidden effect of case management is a 
transfer of power away from individual parties and their lawyers, and 
 
 88. See Resnik, supra note 2, at 1002–03 (“The judicial embrace of roles held by other 
social actors—the homogenization of the various kinds of dispute resolvers—has made more 
difficult the task of explaining why some judges should be specially protected, insulated, and 
respected.”). 
 89. Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound 
Procedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 100–01 (1997). 
 90. The aspect of case management that typically draws the heaviest fire is judicial 
involvement in settlement. One prominent concern is that judges deplete the universe of tried 
cases by pushing too hard for settlement. See Galanter, Hundred-Year Decline, supra note 85, at 
1266 (“Th[e] transformation of judicial product involves factors that played at most a minor role 
in the long-term decline of trials. One such factor is the ascendance of a judicial ideology that 
commends intensive judicial case management and active promotion of settlements (with 
settlement seen as a result superior to trial).”). Another concern is that the judge who is to try 
the case should not be involved in the settlement process, because the parties might feel 
pressure to conform to the judge’s views on settlement or the judge might become biased during 
the course of the settlement process. See Resnik, supra note 3, 425–31. This Article does not 
address the role of trial judges in settlement. 
 91. Resnik, supra note 3, at 380; see also Peterson, supra note 3, at 45 (arguing that case 
management gives federal judges too much primary discretion (making case management 
standardless) and secondary discretion (making case management guided but unreviewable)). 
 92. See Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for 
Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 50 (1994) (stating that if we had 
substance-specific rules, then “[f]inally, judges [could] begin to return to their proper roles—
deciding, or facilitating the decision of cases on their merits; making decisions about cases that 
apply to more than the one case that is in front of them; and having rules to guide them in their 
future decisions”). 
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also from juries or appellate courts who would review decisions on 
the merits when and if rendered.”93 
So, how should Article III judges spend their time? Deciding 
merits issues? Managing their cases? The federal judiciary’s answer is 
“both.” In the Civil Litigation Management Manual, the Judicial 
Conference puts the question and answer this way: “Is a federal judge 
an adjudicator or a case manager? . . . In fact both functions—
adjudication and case management—are critical judicial roles, the 
second used in service of the first.”94 
I think that is correct. Good case managers work with the parties 
and their lawyers to identify the real issues in dispute and to identify 
how best to proceed to resolve those issues. Good case managers 
show the parties and their lawyers, through their management 
activities, that they have taken the time to truly understand what the 
case is about and that they are willing to invest their time to ensure 
that the pretrial process remains focused on the real issues. Good case 
management is not an opaque process that occurs solely behind 
chambers’ doors. Rather, good case managers interact with the 
parties and welcome—if not invite or even require—client 
participation. Practiced that way, case management provides the 
parties not just with an opportunity to be heard but also with an 
opportunity to see (and feel) that justice is being done. 
Consider the type of Rule 16 conference suggested by Judge 
Rosenthal.95 In one of these live conferences, the lawyers (and 
sometimes also the parties) would be in the same room as the judge. 
Some or all of the following might take place: 
 
 
 93. Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 62 (1997). Professor 
Stephen Yeazell makes the intriguing observation that the shift in power from appellate courts 
to trial courts is a result of increasing the number of pretrial events that do not produce 
immediately reviewable judgments. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of 
Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 660–61. He notes that although the 1938 rules 
shifted the focus away from pleadings and trial (the front and the back of the case) toward case-
development activities that occur in between, they left the final-judgment rule intact. Id. 
Professor Yeazell also suggests that appellate courts, having been displaced by the rulemaking 
process as the principal producers of rules regulating trial-level activity, have embraced more 
discretionary review standards because they no longer have a personal interest in the 
development of those regulations. Id. at 666. 
 94. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at 1. 
 95. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 241–42. 
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• The lawyers and the judge might engage in a genuine 
exchange about the case so that the judge can learn 
critical information about the needs of the case. 
• The judge might learn whether the parties have had a 
meaningful Rule 26(f) conference or whether they have 
just gone through the motions and therefore are not truly 
in a position to discuss their pretrial needs. 
• The judge might learn whether there are threshold issues 
to be resolved and might consider having the parties 
conduct discovery or make dispositive motions in stages. 
• The judge might discuss e-discovery issues with the 
parties, exploring ways to focus the process and address 
potential problems before they mushroom.96 
 
The overriding theme is that judges who take the time to talk with the 
lawyers and involve the parties at the Rule 16 stage are in a much 
better position to tailor the pretrial process to achieve the “just, 
speedy, and inexpensive” determination of the claims.97 Moreover, 
these types of activities, geared toward facilitating a prompt and 
efficient resolution of the merits, strike me as being just as “judicial” 
as deciding motions or presiding over a trial.98 But not everyone 
agrees, and I certainly respect the views of those who see things 
differently. 
 
 96. See id. at 241. If the participants at the Duke Conference are any indication, this is also 
the type of Rule 16 conference that lawyers would like judges to conduct. See Memorandum 
from Judge Kravitz to Judge Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 8 (“The first Rule 16 conference should 
be a conference. It should be planned carefully by the lawyers, seized as an invaluable 
opportunity by the judge, and often attended by the parties. The parties should be made aware 
of the strengths and weaknesses of their positions, the costs of litigating, the means available 
[for] reducing the costs of litigating, and the availability of alternative dispute resolution 
methods.”). 
 97. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 98. Cf. Alvin H. Rubin, The Managerial Calendar: Some Pragmatic Suggestions About 
Achieving the Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4 
JUST. SYS. J. 135, 136 (1979) (“The judicial role is not a passive one. ‘A purely adversarial 
system, uncontrolled by the judiciary, is not an automatic guarantee that justice will be done. It 
is impossible to consider seriously the vital elements of a fair trial without considering that it is 
the duty of the judge, and the judge alone, as the sole representative of the public interest, to 
step in at any stage of the litigation where his intervention is necessary in the interests of 
justice.’” (quoting Irving R. Kaufman, The Philosophy of Effective Judicial Supervision Over 
Litigation, 29 F.R.D. 191, 211, 216 (1961))). According to Professor Rosenberg, the 1983 
Advisory Committee adopted Judge Rubin’s views. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 2209. 
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For those who think that case management is proper and 
important but believe that Article III judges should devote their time 
to making merits decisions, one solution is to delegate the case-
management tasks—including scheduling and overseeing discovery—
to magistrate judges. Presumably, the Article III judges then would 
be more able and willing to engage with the parties regarding the 
merits of the case. Delegating the pretrial case management to 
magistrate judges is also seen as a way of eliminating the threat of 
merits coercion posed when the Article III judge who will decide the 
merits gets involved in management issues.99 
There is much to be said in favor of the magistrate judge system. 
The federal judicial system has come to rely increasingly on 
magistrate judges to assist with civil pretrial matters.100 The Judicial 
Conference recommended the effective use of magistrate judges to 
combat cost and delay in its Final Report to Congress on the CJRA.101 
Similarly, the Judicial Conference’s Long Range Plan promotes the 
enhanced use of magistrate judges for civil pretrial matters.102 Nobody 
doubts that there are scores of excellent magistrate judges across the 
country providing exemplary civil case-management service. 
But, as is true with so much in the world of civil case 
management, there is a second side to this story. Some view dividing 
responsibility between “the merits” and “case management” as an 
artificial separation that undermines efficiency and fairness. In its 
recently published Civil Caseflow Management Guidelines,103 the 
IAALS recommends that “[a] single judge . . . be assigned to each 
case at the beginning of litigation and . . . stay with the case through 
 
 99. See Peterson, supra note 3, at 92 (“Any effective solution should provide for the 
division of [magistrate and Article III] powers to prevent the use of substantive decision-making 
power as a coercive tool in pretrial management.”). 
 100. On referral from the district judge, magistrate judges may resolve nondispositive 
matters (subject to district court review for clear error) and may enter findings and 
recommendations as to dispositive matters. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2006); FED. R. CIV. P. 72. 
With consent of the parties, magistrate judges may assume full authority over those matters 
(and also conduct the trial if needed). 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 73. 
 101. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 41, at 2, 20 (identifying the 
reduction of cost and delay as an overall goal and recommending the effective use of 
magistrates). 
 102. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 58, at 101–02 (“Magistrate judges 
should perform judicial duties to the extent constitutionally permissible and consistent with 
sound judicial policy.”). 
 103. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11. 
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its disposition.”104 The Civil Caseflow Management Guidelines 
elaborate on this principle: 
The use of a single judge assigned to a case from beginning to end 
provides the parties in the litigation with a sense of continuity. With 
respect to discovery issues and disputes, the same judge who handles 
the pretrial and trial matters is in a better position to resolve 
discovery matters because of his or her familiarity with the issues, 
the parties, the history of the case, and the relationship between the 
parties. For cases that go to trial, the judge who handled all pretrial 
and discovery matters in a case is in a better position to try the case, 
based on a familiarity with the issues, the parties, and the history of 
the case.105 
Perhaps the principal targets of this recommendation are state court 
systems that still do not assign cases to a single judge for pretrial 
matters. But as written—and, I believe, as intended—it is also 
directed at what some call the de facto bifurcated bench in some 
federal court districts where the Article III district judges routinely 
delegate all scheduling and discovery management to their magistrate 
judges. 
The results from the recent ABA Section of Litigation Survey 
offer some useful insights into whether lawyers think that using 
magistrate judges to handle pretrial matters conflicts with this “single 
judge” principle. More than 85 percent of the survey respondents 
supported the general principle of having a single judge “handle a 
case from start to finish.”106 But when asked whether it was necessary 
for the judge who would try the case to also handle all pretrial 
matters, the level of agreement dropped to below 65 percent.107 
Moreover, when the survey question specifically inquired into using 
magistrate judges for pretrial matters, nearly 60 percent of the 
 
 104. Id. at 5; see also INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., PILOT 
PROJECT RULES 4 (2009) (“As soon as the complaint is filed, a judge will be assigned to the case 
for all purposes, and . . . will remain assigned to the case through trial and post-trial 
proceedings.”); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. 
LEGAL SYS., supra note 80, at 18 (“A single judicial officer should be assigned to each case at 
the beginning of a lawsuit and should stay with the case through its termination.”). 
 105. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 8–9. 
 106. See ABA SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 78, at 114 (showing that 85.8 percent of total 
respondents either “[a]gree[d]” or “[s]trongly [a]gree[d]” that “[o]ne judicial officer should 
handle a case from start to finish”). 
 107. See id. at 115 (showing that 64.9 percent of total respondents either “[a]gree[d]” or 
“[s]trongly [a]gree[d]” that “[t]he judge who is going to try the case should handle all pre-trial 
matters”). 
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respondents said they believed that it did not matter whether the trial 
judge or a magistrate judge handled the pretrial matters (so long as 
the pretrial matters are handled promptly).108 These data indicate that 
some of the support for the “one judge” principle extends only to the 
notion that cases should be assigned to individual judges from the 
start and not left on the general draw until set for trial. But they also 
show that a significant percentage of the respondents (more than 40 
percent) specifically disapprove of delegating pretrial matters to 
magistrate judges. 
The IAALS and the ACTL are not alone in questioning the 
wisdom of separating the case-management and merits-adjudication 
functions. More than twenty years ago, Professor Linda Silberman 
worried that reflexively referring all discovery matters to magistrate 
judges might actually undercut effective case management by taking a 
key aspect of overall case management out of the district judge’s 
hands.109 Judge Easterbrook—who is well known for his skepticism of 
case management generally—has argued that assigning discovery to 
magistrate judges is inefficient because (in his experience) the 
assignment typically does not give the magistrate judge the authority 
to limit discovery to potentially dispositive slices of the case.110 In his 
paper for the Duke Conference, Judge Higginbotham, although 
agreeing that some case management is valuable, also criticized the 
practice of delegating case management to magistrate judges; in his 
view, that delegation is symptomatic of a disturbing trend of making 
the trial court process a paper process of delegable duties.111 
Ultimately, the issue comes down to this: even if we could all 
agree that case management by somebody is a good thing, we still 
have to find someone to do it. Any reform efforts that would increase 
the amount of case management performed by Article III judges must 
be prepared to meet the criticism that doing so will only further erode 
our sense of what it means to be an Article III judge. Delegating the 
 
 108. See id. at 116 (showing that 58.5 percent of total respondents either “[a]gree[d]” or 
“[s]trongly [a]gree[d]” that “[i]t does not matter whether the trial judge or a magistrate judge 
handles pre-trial matters, so long as they are handled promptly”). 
 109. Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2141 (1989). Alternatively, Professor Silberman worried that if 
delegation were successful it would stifle real procedural reform by relieving the symptoms of 
cost and delay without addressing the root causes. See id. (“[T]o take burdensome discovery 
away from judges . . . place[s] it elsewhere in the system.”). 
 110. Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 639–40. 
 111. Higginbotham, supra note 86, at 759–60. 
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case-management duties to magistrate judges might address that 
particular concern, but proponents of true single-assignment schemes 
object that the bifurcated bench undermines the efficiencies that case 
management is meant to supply. Something has to give. If we are 
going to have case management, someone has to do it. If neither 
Article III judges nor magistrate judges should manage federal civil 
cases, then who?112 If neither is acceptable, and there is no other 
source to provide it, then we cannot rely on case management to 
achieve the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” determination of 
actions.113 
B. Should There Be Different Rules for Different Types of Cases? 
Properly done, active judicial case management ensures that the 
pretrial activities in each case are appropriate and proportional to the 
needs of the case. Judges individually tailor the pretrial process in 
each case, sometimes by guiding the parties to make better choices, 
sometimes by working with the parties to help them agree on the size 
and scope of the pretrial activities, and sometimes by resolving 
disputes and imposing limits when the parties cannot agree or when 
the parties both engage in unreasonable behaviors. The notion of 
tailoring, however, is directly linked to the fact that, for the most part, 
the Civil Rules are the same for all cases, regardless of their shape or 
size. If each case starts with the same set of Civil Rules, but the goal is 
for each case to have a tailored pretrial process, then the task of doing 
the tailoring must fall to the parties (if they can agree) or to the judge. 
But judicial case-tailoring is not the only method available for 
dealing with differences in the pretrial needs of different cases. This 
Section focuses on a different approach—having different sets of 
rules for different types of cases. One possibility might be to have 
different sets of rules (or special rule provisions) for specific subject 
areas. Another possibility might be to distinguish between cases 
 
 112. This is not to concede that “neither” is the correct answer. To the contrary, I think the 
correct answer is “both.” As discussed above, I think case management is not just an 
appropriate but a critical aspect of the pretrial process and that it is wholly consistent with the 
role of the district judge. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text. But I also think that it is 
perfectly appropriate for district judges to capitalize on the assistance available from magistrate 
judges by involving them in the pretrial process. The concerns raised about the loss of efficiency 
that can result from splitting tasks between the district judge and the magistrate judge are real, 
but the solution lies not in creating a rigid either-or scheme but in teamwork and 
communication between the judges when the pretrial activities are shared. 
 113. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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based on size or complexity and to have separate “tracks” with 
different sets of rules geared toward the needs of the cases in those 
tracks. In the end, the idea is to rely less on individual judges by doing 
the tailoring at the front end when designing the rules rather than at 
the back end through case-specific case management. The process of 
designing differentiated rule schemes, however, raises its own array of 
tricky problems. 
1. Transsubstantivity and the One-Size-Fits-All Debate.  Before 
turning to the various proposals for differentiated rules, many of 
which have been implemented in different forms in different 
jurisdictions, I start with an overview of the federal Civil Rules system 
as it currently stands. There is only one set of Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Subject to a few exceptions, they apply to all civil actions 
in the U.S. district courts.114 And there is only one form of action in 
the district courts—“the civil action.”115 Add this up, and you get a 
relatively simple picture: the same set of Civil Rules applies to all civil 
cases in federal court, regardless of the size, complexity, or subject 
matter of the case, or the dollar amount in controversy. This is no 
accident.116 Rebelling against the headaches and costs caused by the 
formalism of common law pleading, enamored of the flexibility and 
simplicity of equity practice, and fortified by their belief that 
procedure was merely the handmaiden of justice, the original drafters 
of the Civil Rules consciously and deliberately set out to design a 
single set of rules that could be applied to every case.117 
Procedural rules that apply to all types of cases are said to be 
transsubstantive.118 The term does not exactly roll off the tongue, but 
it is descriptive and neutral. A more colorful term is that the Civil 
 
 114. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a) (stating the rules’ applicability to particular 
proceedings). 
 115. FED. R. CIV. P. 2. 
 116. Indeed, it may even have been inevitable. See Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of 
Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 
DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 383 (2010) (noting that the original drafters appear to have assumed, 
given the nature of their task and the circumstances that led to the Rules Enabling Act, that the 
rules they would be developing would apply uniformly to all cases). 
 117. For a history of the Rules Enabling Act, Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 
(2006), see generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 
1015 (1982); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987); Tidmarsh, supra note 8. 
 118. The term “trans-substantive” was coined by Professor Robert Cover. See Robert M. 
Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 
718 (1975). 
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Rules are “one size fits all.”119 When used, that label usually is offered 
in the spirit of criticism, not praise. 
Critics of the transsubstantive design of the Civil Rules contend 
that the cases that comprise the federal civil docket are too varied in 
their needs to be handled effectively or efficiently by any single set of 
rules.120 By trying to be all things for all cases, the critics argue, the 
Civil Rules increase costs by imposing “Cadillac” procedures 
designed for complex litigation on a docket populated mostly by 
“Chevy” cases.121 The notion that there should be multiple sets of 
rules pegged to different types or sizes of cases may be gaining steam 
with the practicing bar. Nearly one-third of the respondents to the 
ABA Section of Litigation Member Survey agreed with the 
proposition that one set of rules cannot accommodate every case.122 
I think the one-size-fits-all description of the Civil Rules is inapt 
and potentially misleading. It depicts the Civil Rules as a heavy wool 
winter coat, size 48 long, that all civil cases are forced to wear 
regardless of height, weight, or build, in all weather and all seasons. In 
my mind, if one is to stick with the imagery of haberdashery, it is 
more accurate to say that the Civil Rules are bespoke. Only pleadings 
and initial disclosures are required.123 The rest is custom made. If the 
parties so choose, or if the court—acting as tailor—so orders, the case 
can get a breezy linen shirt instead of the heavy winter coat. Or, to 
pursue the automotive metaphor, the Civil Rules are a showroom of 
makes and models; it is ultimately up to the parties and the court to 
determine whether they drive off in a Cadillac or a Chevy. 
There lies the connection to case management. The process I just 
described requires active and meaningful case management. Without 
case management, the parties and their lawyers are free to do as they 
 
 119. E.g., INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 6; 
Subrin, supra note 116, passim. 
 120. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 6 
(“Treating all cases in the same way results in under-management of some cases, over-
management of others, and in both situations increased costs or delay, or both.”); Subrin, supra 
note 116, at 388–93 (arguing that transsubstantive procedures waste time and money, reduce 
focus and predictability, and tend to precipitate or force settlement). 
 121. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. 
REV. 535, 563 (“The Cadillac process they enshrine helps to drive out of federal court those who 
can afford only a Ford.”). 
 122. See ABA SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 78, at 31 (showing that 38.6 percent of total 
respondents either “[a]gree[d]” or “[s]trongly [a]gree[d]” that “[o]ne set of Rules cannot 
accommodate every case type”). 
 123. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), 26(a). 
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like.124 Though some fixed limits do exist, the size of the pretrial 
process is determined principally by how aggressively one or both 
sides pursue discovery and engage in motion practice.125 
Metaphorically speaking, one side may want only the equivalent of a 
light spring jacket but, as a result of the other party’s conduct or 
demands, end up wearing a full-length wool coat. (To continue the 
other metaphor, one side may think the case warrants only Chevy-
level treatment but end up litigating it in Cadillac style, at Cadillac 
prices.) The Civil Rules leave it to the individual judge to custom-fit 
the procedure to the case. When people criticize the Civil Rules as 
being one-size-fits-all, they are arguing—either explicitly or 
implicitly—that federal judges lack the will or the ability to be good 
case tailors. 
Is that critique right? I think most supporters of the case-
management approach would say that federal judges already have 
ample tools to be good tailors, though the search for more and better 
tools is ongoing. That being said, even the strongest supporters of 
case management recognize that some judges are simply not making 
good, or sufficiently frequent, use of the case-management tools they 
do have.126 Indeed, one of the topics for the Duke Conference is to see 
if we can identify ways to improve the effective use of those tools or 
to identify more or better tools. But critics of the case-management 
model would argue that the one-size-fits-all model suffers from flaws 
that cannot be fixed by more or better case management or by an 
expanded set of case-management tools. My sympathies lie with the 
supporters of case management. I think the case-management model 
does work, though I agree it can (and probably must) be improved. 
At bottom, I think case management by judges, custom-fitting the 
procedure in the case based on the options available under the Civil 
 
 124. See Marcus, supra note 19, at 1589 (2003) (“Without case management . . . lawyers 
would be free of substantial constraint . . . .”). 
 125. Default numerical limits exist, for example, for depositions and for interrogatories. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (permitting no more than ten depositions per side); id. 30(d)(1) 
(imposing a seven-hour limit on depositions); id. 33(a)(1) (permitting no more than twenty-five 
interrogatories per pair of parties). While nothing in the Civil Rules limits the frequency or 
number of dispositive motions, many districts have limitations in their local rules. See, e.g., W.D. 
OKLA. LCVR 56.1(a) (permitting each party to file only one summary judgment motion without 
the leave of the court). 
 126. See Grimm & Cabraser, supra note 75, at 11 (“The problem is an absence of will.”); 
Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 231–32 (suggesting a need to “increase the use of the rules that are 
already on the books”). 
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Rules, remains our best strategy for seeing that cases receive the right 
type and amount of procedure. 
The purpose of this Section, however, is not to champion case 
management as the best method for ensuring that each case receives a 
type and degree of procedure best suited to its needs. Rather, it is to 
explore alternative methods for doing so, to which I now turn. 
2. Proposals for Differentiated Rules.  This Section explores three 
proposals for differentiated rules: (1) substance-specific procedures, 
(2) tracking systems, and (3) simplified procedures. It is important to 
make clear at the outset that these alternatives and case management 
are not mutually exclusive. I do not think any of the proponents of 
these options would urge that they should be adopted in lieu of—or 
to the exclusion of—all forms of case management. Indeed, some 
reform proposals call for abandoning the one-size-fits-all system, 
adopting specialized schemes, and ratcheting up case management 
within those specialized schemes.127 Nonetheless, there remains a 
critical link between case-management reform and proposals for 
differentiated-rule schemes: any proposal to solve cost and delay 
issues by enhancing the case-management powers of the judge should 
expect to answer to critics who believe that no amount of case 
management can solve those issues if our starting point is a single set 
of rules for all cases. 
a. Substance-Specific Rules.  The Rules Enabling Act128 says 
surprisingly little about what the structure of the Civil Rules should 
be.129 The only drafting norm stated in the Rules Enabling Act is that 
the Civil Rules are to be “general.”130 A limited interpretation of that 
directive might be that Congress intended only that the Rules be 
geographically uniform—that is, that they would apply in all districts, 
 
 127. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 6–9; AM. 
COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra 
note 80, at 4–5, 18–24. 
 128. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006). 
 129. See Steven S. Gensler, Justness! Speed! Inexpense! An Introduction to The Revolution 
of 1938 Revisited: The Role and Future of the Federal Rules, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 267 (2008) 
(“The text of the Rules Enabling Act yields no normative directives for drafting the Rules.”). 
 130. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). The Rules Enabling Act does provide additional guidance, but it is 
directed more toward scope and limits than norms or structure. For example, the rulemaking 
authority is for rules of “practice and procedure.” Id. And, of course, the rules may not 
“abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” Id. § 2072(b). 
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rejecting any continuing notion of conformity to state practice.131 By 
and large, that is how the Civil Rules operate.132 But the original 
drafters were not just seeking to displace conformity to state 
procedure, and they were not just looking to ensure that federal 
procedure would be geographically uniform. The goal from the start 
was to develop a single set of rules that would apply to all cases 
regardless of size or substance.133 The flexibility provided by modeling 
this set of rules on equity practice would permit the parties and the 
court to adjust them as needed and as applied.134 
Recent reform proposals recommend the creation of substance-
specific rules. The IAALS, for example, writes that the “rulemakers 
should be able to create different sets of rules for different types of 
cases so they can be resolved more expeditiously and efficiently.”135 In 
this regard, the IAALS finds itself in the company of some of the 
most prominent procedure scholars of our time.136 Professor Subrin 
 
 131. See Burbank, supra note 121, at 542 (noting that the Advisory Committee seems to 
have assumed that the Rules Enabling Act carried with it a directive to be transsubstantive and 
not just geographically uniform). 
 132. The Civil Rules do incorporate some geographic variation. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 
4(e) (incorporating state-law service methods); id. 17(b) (incorporating state-law standards on 
the capacity to sue or be sued); id. 64 (incorporating state prejudgment remedies). A much more 
significant source of interdistrict variation comes from local rules. See generally Stephen N. 
Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging 
Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989). For a recent defense of local rules, at least 
as compared to standing orders or other judge-specific practices, see Samuel P. Jordan, Local 
Rules and the Limits of Trans-Territorial Procedure, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010). 
 133. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 381–84 (noting the absence of any evidence suggesting 
that there was any debate “about whether the rules would be uniform in the sense that the same 
rules would apply to all cases”). 
 134. See id. at 384–86 (noting that scholars at the time of the Rules Enabling Act wanted 
rules “as permissive and expansive as equity”); Subrin, supra note 117, at 922–25 (“The 
expansive and flexible aspects of equity are all implicit in the Federal Rules.”). 
 135. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 80, at 4. 
 136. See Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 
OKLA. L. REV. 319, 333 (2008) (“[W]e must bury . . . the thoroughly misguided idea that trans-
substantivity is an independent value or ideal for the Federal Rules.”); Stephen B. Burbank, Of 
Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 693, 715 (1988) (“[T]he trend of modern procedural law has been away from rules that 
make policy choices towards those that confer on trial courts a substantial amount of normative 
discretion.”); Cover, supra note 118, at 731–32 (arguing that, because procedural devices are 
justified partially in terms of substantive objectives, the failure of the Civil Rules to promote 
their substantive objectives in many cases is troubling); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: 
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 547 (1986) (“We must face 
that . . . we need to determine what subsets of cases require special kinds of rules, and write 
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has long called for substance-specific rules on the basis that 
transsubstantive rules require overly general directions and vague 
standards that increase expense and decrease consistency.137 Professor 
Stephen Burbank is also a longtime advocate of substance-specific 
rules; he argues that substance-specific rules that provide more 
detailed guidance—and additional constraints—are preferable to 
transsubstantive rules that rely on judicial discretion.138 
Professor Robert Bone advocates substance-specific rules on the 
basis that transsubstantive rules fail to account for differences in 
substantive priorities.139 According to Bone, to promote the “just” 
adjudication of claims in a world where resource limits make perfect 
accuracy in all cases impossible, the Civil Rules should be designed to 
resolve the most important substantive policies with the greatest 
accuracy.140 As an example, Bone suggests that, because cases 
involving constitutional issues or bodily harm are, relatively speaking, 
more important than cases involving property, special rule provisions 
might be developed to minimize the risk of error in the former 
categories of cases.141 Most recently, he has argued that 
transsubstantive pleading rules misfire because they do not 
adequately account for substantive areas in which the parties face 
 
rules for those kinds of cases.”); Subrin, supra note 92, at 45–56 (making a case for selective 
substance-specific procedure); Subrin, supra note 132, at 2048–51 (“When one begins to define 
procedures more rigorously, it becomes obvious that some cases need different rules.”). 
 137. See Subrin, supra note 92, at 45–56 (making a case for selective substance-specific 
procedure); see also Subrin, supra note 116, at 404–05 (discussing substance-specific protocols). 
 138. See Burbank, supra note 121, at 556–64 (“Growing awareness that questions of ‘mere 
procedure’ may implicate important social policy encourages those who cannot make an 
independent judgment to have only so much confidence in the integrity of the process and the 
quality of the legal products it produces as they do in the actors who control it.”); see also 
Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 
11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1936–37 (1989) (suggesting that empirical data and objective 
guidance are more likely to lead to “equal justice” than is the discretion of judges). 
 139. See Bone, supra note 136, at 333–34 (“The fact that substantive policy is always part of 
procedural justification means that trans-substantivity as an independent value or ideal makes 
no sense at all.”). 
 140. See id. (“[T]he cost as well as the risk of error matters, and error cost is measured in 
terms of the substantive policies at stake.”); see also Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A 
Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 287, 302–05 (2010) (arguing that the 
goal of procedure should be to achieve an optimal distribution of error risks and that an optimal 
distribution should take into account the substantive interests underlying different subjects of 
the law). 
 141. See Bone, supra note 140, at 303; Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: 
Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficiency, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 936 
(1999). 
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significant information asymmetries.142 Thus, Bone might propose 
different pleading standards for antitrust actions than for breach-of-
contract actions given that plaintiffs typically have presuit access to 
the key facts in the latter but not the former. 
The debate is hardly one-sided, however. An equally prominent 
group of procedure scholars think that the benefits of 
transsubstantive rules outweigh their costs.143 Professor Geoffrey 
Hazard urges us to remember that one of the virtues of 
transsubstantive procedural rules is that developments in a rule from 
one type of case can be employed in other types of cases, allowing for 
the development of new types of socially beneficial litigation.144 
Professor Carrington warns against the politics that substance-specific 
rules would interject into the rulemaking process, concluding that the 
task of creating special rules for particular types of cases is properly 
left to Congress.145 Professor Rick Marcus has embraced both 
points.146 
The transsubstantivity debate has important implications for case 
management. Without the ability to customize the pretrial process via 
case management, it is doubtful that a single set of rules could service 
all cases across all subject areas. Indeed, many advocates of 
 
 142. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 94 
IOWA L. REV. 873, 936 (2009) (calling for substance-specific rules in the types of cases that most 
seriously involve meritless filings—such as those with significant informational asymmetries—
because transsubstantive rules cannot account for the various cost-benefit tradeoffs at stake in 
different types of cases). 
 143. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded 
Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2067, 2074–87 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-
Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244–47 
(1989); David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil 
Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 415–26 (2010); Marcus, supra note 1, at 776–79. 
 144. See Hazard, supra note 143, at 2247 (“The Federal Rules have been employed in ‘social 
justice’ litigation precisely because they are cast in general terms, rather than tailored to specific 
types of litigation.”). 
 145. See Carrington, supra note 143, at 2074–75 (listing reasons for pursuing the ideal of 
“perfect neutrality in the rulemaking process [and] in the procedure rules themselves”); Paul D. 
Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 
597, 617, 661 (2010) (asserting that “special rules for a substantive category of cases . . . would 
be a task for Congress” and that “since the mid-1980s . . . the Supreme Court’s revisions of the 
Civil Rules have [had] a clearly visible political aim”). 
 146. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 778–79 (noting that “[a] shift away from trans-substantive 
procedures” would “eliminate the positive effect of applying procedural learning from one 
substantive area to another” and “constrict[] the focus on the winners and losers in such a way 
as to magnify the likelihood that those with greater power will be the winners”). 
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substance-specific rules articulate the relationship in reverse, saying 
that customized case management by the judge renders the rules 
transsubstantive in name only.147 What is undeniably true is that there 
is an inverse relationship between substance-specific rules and case 
management. Defenders of transsubstantivity say we do not need 
substance-specific rules because judges can customize via case 
management. Advocates of substance-specific rules respond that we 
would not need so much customized case management if we had 
more customized rules. Thus, any reform proposal that would give 
judges more case-management power as a means of allowing for even 
greater case customization must be prepared to answer to the critics 
who think that those distinctions should be reduced to rule text. 
That being said, we must be careful not to paint this debate as 
presenting a strictly binary choice between pure rule 
transsubstantivity and substance-based rule balkanization. Fidelity to 
the principle of transsubstantivity is, for all practical purposes, a 
question of degree.148 I am not aware of any scholar who seriously 
argues that we should have separate rules for every different subject. 
The flaws in that approach were made clear under the common-law 
writ system, which nobody I know of thinks should be revived.149 
Moreover, the court-made rules already depart from pure 
transsubstantivity in two ways.150 First, we already have special sets of 
court-made rules for some categories of proceedings; special rules 
already exist for habeas corpus cases,151 for admiralty proceedings,152 
 
 147. See Burbank, supra note 136, at 715 (“Federal Rules that avoid policy choices and that 
in essence chart ad hoc decision-making by trial judges are uniform and hence trans-substantive 
in only the most trivial sense.” (citing Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. 
L. REV. 1463, 1473–74 (1987) (book review))); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory 
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 527 (1986) (“[T]he emergence of managerial 
judging . . . exemplif[ies] ad hoc efforts to tailor rules to individual cases.”); Silberman, supra 
note 109, at 2176 (“[B]y and large the erosion of trans-substantive rules has come via ad hoc 
informal, customized procedures devised by judges . . . .”). 
 148. Gensler, supra note 129, at 267. 
 149. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 388 (“Those who cherish transsubstantive procedure are 
right that we do not want to return to anything like the writ system, even if we could.”). 
 150. Congress, of course, remains free to displace, modify, or embellish the transsubstantive, 
court-made rules with specific statutory provisions. See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2006) (instituting heightened pleading requirements in 
securities fraud cases). 
 151. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District 
Courts (2006) (implementing special rules for cases involving petitions for writs of habeas 
corpus). 
 152. FED. R. CIV. P. A–F (providing supplemental Rules for admiralty or maritime claims). 
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and, most recently, for civil forfeiture cases.153 Second, we already 
have some substance-specific provisions within the generally 
transsubstantive Civil Rules. Rule 26 exempts some categories of 
cases from mandatory disclosures.154 Rule 9 provides substance-
dependent pleading standards.155 And Rule 23.1 is explicitly limited to 
shareholder derivative actions.156 
As a basic principle, I strongly support having a single set of rules 
that applies to all cases. In particular, I agree with those 
commentators who think that the decision whether to have special 
rules for particular substantive areas (such as special rules for 
antitrust actions or civil rights actions) is best left to Congress.157 At 
the same time, one must acknowledge that some precedent for 
departures from transsubstantivity does exist. It also must be 
acknowledged that proposals to add a few discrete substance-specific 
rule provisions here and there, fitted within the generally 
transsubstantive rules framework, raise much different questions than 
would, for example, a proposal to adopt wholly separate rule schemes 
for tort cases, contract cases, and civil rights cases.158 
 
 153. Id. G (providing a supplemental Rule for in rem forfeiture actions). 
 154. Id. 26(a)(1)(B) (exempting nine types of proceedings). 
 155. Id. 9(b) (requiring that allegations of fraud be pleaded with particularity). 
 156. Id. 23.1. 
 157. This is not to say that I support direct rulemaking by Congress. Court rulemaking 
through the existing rulemaking process still represents the best method for tapping into the 
widest range of expertise, for gathering empirical data, and for careful study of the issues. See 
Bone, supra note 141, at 938 (“Because the process requires rulemakers to infer general 
principles from practice, it is much better suited to the courts than to the legislature.”); Richard 
Marcus, Not Dead Yet, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 299, 313–14 (2008) (praising the federal rulemaking 
process as “institutionalized and highly expert” as well as “independent and relatively 
apolitical”). Rather, it is simply to say that I do not find in the current Rules Enabling Act 
scheme any clear warrant to make broad departures from the transsubstantive model or from 
the normative benchmark of crafting rules to achieve the “just, speedy, and efficient” 
adjudication of all claims. See Gensler, supra note 129, at 268 (“[O]ne finds little to suggest that 
Congress equated the goal of justness in the rules with a rulemaking process driven by 
normative metrics, the policy values underlying substantive laws, or the distribution of error 
costs . . . .”). Should Congress conclude that departures from the transsubstantive model are 
warranted, however, Congress can send that signal with legislation that provides more detailed 
instructions to the rulemakers or by engaging in a cooperative rulemaking process with the goal 
of producing rule changes that would be enacted legislatively. See id. at 262 n.28 (discussing the 
cooperative process between Congress and the rulemakers that led to the development and 
enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 502). 
 158. See Burbank, supra note 121, at 542 (distinguishing “wholly different procedural 
regimes for different bodies of substantive law” from “altering only discrete Federal Rules, or 
portions thereof, that do not satisfactorily implement the policies underlying a body of 
substantive law or a particular scheme of substantive rights”). 
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b. Case Tracking.  Tracking is another reform proposal that 
competes, at least in part, with the case-management model. The idea 
of tracking is simple and sensible. Different cases have different 
needs. Rather than leaving it up to the judge to tailor the procedure 
to the needs of the case, the Civil Rules would create tracks with 
different sets of procedures. Then it would just be a matter of putting 
each case on the right track. The purpose of tracking is cost control. 
While tracking schemes may include complex-case tracks that come 
with extra procedure, the principal focus invariably is to create 
simple-case tracks (or “fast” tracks) that offer less procedure. For this 
reason, I like to think of tracking schemes as being akin to kids’ 
menus at restaurants.159 The kids get to eat (that is, litigants are not 
denied access to pretrial procedure). But their options are limited, 
and the portions are reduced—as is, we expect, the price. 
Tracking has a very respectable pedigree. In its 1990 report, the 
Federal Courts Study Committee expressed interest in case tracking, 
though it quickly added that “more study is needed to learn whether 
tracking or much more individualized case management is generally 
preferable for the federal civil caseload.”160 When Congress passed 
the CJRA that same year,161 one of the six main reform principles to 
be considered by each district was the “systematic, differential 
treatment of civil cases.”162 While many districts opted to continue to 
rely on individual judges to provide case tailoring, a number of 
districts adopted tracking systems, at least nominally.163 Tracking 
continues to have strong support in some quarters. Several districts 
 
 159. See Steven S. Gensler, Procedure a la Carte, Presentation at Association of American 
Law Schools Annual Meeting, Section on Civil Procedure Program (Jan. 8, 2010). 
 160. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 57, at 100. 
 161. CJRA, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). 
 162. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(1) (2006). See generally James S. Kakalik, Terence Dunworth, 
Laural A. Hill, Daniel McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas M. Pace & Mary E. Vaiana, Just, 
Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management Under the Civil Justice 
Reform Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17, 20 (1997) (listing the case-management principles of the 
CJRA). 
 163. See JAMES S. KAKALIK, TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL A. HILL, DANIEL 
MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS 30 (1996) (listing 
methods of differential case management adopted by pilot and comparison districts); DAVID 
RAUMA & DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLANS: A SOURCEBOOK 83–103 (1995) (listing differential 
case-management plans for all districts). 
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retain tracking mechanisms in their local rules.164 The IAALS 
endorses tracking.165 Professor Miller recently indicated interest in 
exploring tracking.166 
For a comparative perspective, we might look to England, which 
established a case tracking system in 1998 as part of the Woolf 
Reforms.167 The English system has three tracks: small-claims track, 
fast track, and multi-track.168 The small-claims track is the normal 
track for most cases in which the value of the claim is less than 
£5,000.169 The fast track is the normal track for most cases in which the 
value of the claim is between £5,000 and £25,000.170 All other cases 
normally are placed on the multi-track.171 But these track-allocation 
criteria are not determinative. Ultimately, the judge makes the track-
allocation decision based on both the general allocation scheme and a 
list of case-specific factors.172 The judge may also reallocate a case to a 
different track at a later time.173 
While tracking makes sense in theory, in the federal courts it has 
proven problematic in implementation.174 It does work at the margins. 
 
 164. See, e.g., N.D. GA. CIV. R. 26.2.A (assigning cases to one of three discovery tracks 
based on subject matter); S.D. IND. R. 16.1(b) (incorporating a case-management plan that 
requires the parties to select from one of four tracks); N.D. & S.D. MISS. CIV. R. 1 (creating six 
case-management tracks: Expedited, Standard, Complex, Administrative, Mass Tort, and 
Suspension); M.D.N.C. CIV. R. 26.1(a) (creating three discovery tracks: Standard, Complex, and 
Exceptional); N.D. OHIO R. 16.2 (creating five case-management tracks: Expedited, Standard, 
Complex, Administrative, and Mass Torts). 
 165. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 7 
(“Judges should develop a differentiated case management system that includes simplified 
procedure for some cases and more intricate procedure for other kinds of cases.”). 
 166. See Miller, supra note 4, at 120 (“Tracking—at least in some form—is an idea whose 
time may have come.”). 
 167. See LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR 
ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES 13–102 (1996) (proposing and 
detailing a system of judicial case management). 
 168. CPR, (2006) pt. 26.1(2) (U.K.). For a more thorough discussion of England’s tracking 
scheme, see STUART SIME, A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO CIVIL PROCEDURE 210–13 (12th ed. 
2009). 
 169. CPR 26.6(1)–(3). 
 170. Id. 26.6(4)–(5) (excluding cases in which trial is likely to last more than one day and 
cases with extensive expert evidence). 
 171. Id. 26.6(6). 
 172. Id. 26.7 (providing the general rule for allocation); id. 26.8 (listing matters relevant to 
track allocation). In cases involving claims with no financial value, the court simply selects the 
track it considers most suitable. See id. 26.7(2). 
 173. Id. 26.10. 
 174. The development of tracking systems in state courts presents a much different situation 
because of differences in the cases that populate the state court docket. For example, it is almost 
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For example, federal courts have long tracked certain types of cases 
like social security appeals and student loan collections that, for 
various reasons, either do not fit or do not need the general pretrial 
scheme.175 But that is the low-hanging fruit; even without tracking, 
courts would have (and have had) little trouble determining the 
proper level of procedure in those contexts. In order to add real 
value, a tracking system would have to take the general population of 
cases and efficiently sort those cases into separate groups that 
accurately and fairly reflect the amount of procedure appropriate to 
the cases in each group. More specifically, because the principal goal 
of tracking is to reduce cost and delay by identifying “simple” cases 
that can be processed using downsized or streamlined procedures, the 
real challenge is to develop a tracking system that can sift the 
“simple” cases out of the general docket.176 
Efforts to create simple-case tracks in federal court have not 
fared well. One of the essential elements of a successful tracking 
system is that each track must be used with sufficient frequency to 
justify its existence.177 In federal court, however, it has proved difficult 
to create meaningful simple-case tracks because of heated 
disagreements about how to define a significant population of federal 
 
a given that a state will have special rules, if not a special court, for small-claims cases. In 
addition, some states have had success using tracking techniques in particular subject-matter 
areas. See Lande, supra note 68, at 97–98 (“Studies have found that in family courts using DCM 
systems, disputes were resolved more quickly, the number of court hearings and the amount of 
repeat litigation were reduced, and, most importantly, the percentage of highly distressed 
children was reduced.”). 
 175. See COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at 130–31 (“Many 
districts include an automatic track assignment process for certain types of cases. Administrative 
or appeals cases, such as Social Security or bankruptcy appeals, are identified by their pleadings 
and are automatically assigned to the administrative/appeals track.”); KAKALIK ET AL., supra 
note 163, at 45 (noting “special procedures for certain types of cases that have traditionally 
required only minimal management—typically prisoner petitions, Social Security appeals, 
government loan recovery cases, and bankruptcy appeals”). Moreover, the Civil Rules perform 
a form of tracking for these types of cases by excepting them from various pretrial requirements. 
See supra notes 150–56 and accompanying text. 
 176. Comparatively, it is easier to identify the complex cases. See JAMES S. KAKALIK, 
TERENCE DUNWORTH, LAURAL A. HILL, DANIEL MCCAFFREY, MARIAN OSHIRO, NICHOLAS 
M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER 
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 49 (1996) (“Cases at either extreme of the complexity 
spectrum are relatively easy to fit into a track.”). But the value of identifying these cases is 
comparatively less because the result is typically to flag the case for more individualized 
attention, not less. 
 177. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT: 
IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL 16 (1993) (listing as an assessment criterion that “[e]ach of the 
DCM tracks is used with sufficient frequency to justify its existence”). 
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court cases for a simple-case track. There is little point in creating a 
simple-case track if we cannot identify very many cases to put on it. 
The search for candidates for the simple-case track in the federal 
docket raises a critical and difficult question: what features make a 
case appropriate for the simplified or streamlined procedures 
associated with the simple-case track? 
One method might be to use the amount in controversy as a 
proxy for whether a case is simple. In England, for example, the 
small-claims track and the fast track are based principally on the 
amount in controversy, set at £5,000 and £25,000 respectively. If we 
take just the fast-track limit and assume a two-dollars-to-one-pound 
conversion rate, we get an amount in controversy of $50,000. So, 
perhaps all cases in which the amount in controversy is less than 
$50,000 might be assigned to the simple-case track.178 That scheme, 
however, would capture no diversity jurisdiction cases, given that 
diversity jurisdiction requires an amount in controversy of more than 
$75,000.179 This result illustrates a somewhat obvious but nonetheless 
critical point: the types of cases placed in simple-case or fast tracks in 
other systems often do not exist in the federal docket because of the 
limits of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. 
A tracking scheme that allocated cases with an amount in 
controversy of less than $50,000 likely would capture many federal 
question cases, given that there is no minimum amount in controversy 
for federal question jurisdiction.180 But many of those low-dollar cases 
might be complex or have a social or policy value that exceeds the 
damages at stake. Might not many of those cases warrant access to the 
standard set of procedures, subject to individual case-tailoring by the 
judge?181 For that reason, Professor Subrin has endorsed a mechanism 
 
 178. Coincidentally (I assume), that was also the amount-in-controversy threshold that 
Professor Ed Cooper used when he experimented with drafting simplified rules in his capacity 
as Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules. See Edward H. Cooper, Simplified 
Rules of Federal Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1794, 1805 (2002) (adopting $50,000 as the 
general threshold for application of “simplified rules”). 
 179. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
 180. See Cooper, supra note 178, at 1797 (“Looking at all cases filed in federal courts from 
1989 through 1998 . . . [the FJC] found that information about a stated money demand greater 
than $0 was available for only 610,002 [cases], less than 28%. Of this reduced set of cases, 
236,212 involved demands from $1 to $50,000.”). 
 181. To continue the comparison to the English tracking scheme, factors relevant to putting 
a case into a different track include “the likely complexity of the facts, law or evidence” and 
“the importance of the claim to persons who are not parties to the proceedings.” CPR, (2006) 
pt. 26.8(1) (U.K.). According to Professor Sime, “cases involving issues of public importance” 
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that would exempt federal question cases in which “Congress has 
revealed a desire for energetic enforcement . . . by providing for 
multiple damages or fee shifting for successful plaintiffs.”182 But if one 
took out all of the federal question cases that had multiple damages 
or fee-shifting, what would be left for the simple-case track? 
Moreover, of the federal question cases that remained candidates 
for the simple-case track, how many of those would one consider 
“over-procedured” under the current federal pretrial scheme? Rule 
26(a)(1)(B) already exempts many of the more simple federal 
question cases from the required initial disclosures.183 Rule 26(f) 
exempts these same cases from the discovery-planning conference 
and report requirements.184 And Rule 16(b)(1) allows districts to 
enact local rules exempting categories of cases from the scheduling-
order requirements.185 In sum, the Civil Rules already take steps to 
relieve a wide range of cases from various pretrial burdens, further 
shrinking the universe of federal question cases that are in need of a 
simple-case track to unsaddle them from the demands of the federal 
pretrial scheme. 
If we redefine the target population as federal question cases 
that (1) have a low amount in controversy, (2) are currently subject to 
the full range of the federal pretrial process, and (3) do not otherwise 
present social or policy matters justifying the full pretrial process, we 
would then need to ask at least three questions. First, what types of 
cases comprise that population? Second, do we have solid empirical 
data to show that this population of cases is associated with high 
levels of discovery or motion practice? And third, even if those levels 
are high, are they unduly high or are they warranted? In each such 
case, at least one of the parties must think the discovery or motion 
practice is warranted.186 Returning to the overarching question of 
 
are usually allocated to the multi-track even if the amount in controversy is below £25,000. 
SIME, supra note 168, at 212–13. 
 182. Subrin, supra note 116, at 400 (footnote omitted). 
 183. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (exempting “simple” federal question cases like “an action 
for review on an administrative record” and “an action . . . to collect on a student loan”). 
 184. Id. 26(f)(1). 
 185. Id. 16(b)(1). It is my understanding that many districts create scheduling-order 
exemptions for the types of cases that are exempt from initial disclosures and discovery 
planning. 
 186. It is possible, of course, for the parties to engage in excessive pretrial activities even if 
neither thinks it is necessary. On the other hand, if the parties agree that the case needs only 
minimal pretrial activities, they can achieve that without being placed in a restricted track. They 
can restrain themselves individually, they can communicate and cooperatively agree to conduct 
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what gains can be made by formal case-tracking, is the population of 
cases that fit the three criteria above large enough to warrant 
developing and operating a system-wide tracking system as opposed 
to relying on individual case management? 
Alternatively, we could expand the population of candidates for 
the simple-case track by including diversity cases with an amount in 
controversy of some amount between $75,000 and some not-too-high 
figure—say, for example, $250,000.187 I assume that such a scheme 
would capture a significant number of diversity suits, though it would 
trigger inevitable application questions, such as whether to include 
the value of counterclaims, how to value nonmonetary claims, and the 
effect of amendments that raise the amount in controversy above the 
simple-case-track threshold.188 The drafting of such a scheme would 
require considerable care to avoid rewarding gamesmanship or 
creating loopholes that could be exploited. Our experience with 
amount-in-controversy disputes in the removal context should raise 
some legitimate concern that lawyers might try to game a tracking 
system pegged to the amount in controversy.189 We would also need to 
consider whether the benefits of providing a simple-case track for 
those cases (compared with the benefits of case-tailoring) justify the 
inevitable costs of creating the scheme and superintending the 
allocation of cases to the tracks. And, as a final policy alternative, one 
might even question whether it would be better to raise the amount-
in-controversy requirement to $250,000 (or whatever threshold we 
 
minimal pretrial activities, and, if they want the court’s force behind their views (to prevent 
defection), they can communicate their views to the judge (via the Rule 26(f) discovery planning 
report and at the Rule 16 scheduling conference if there is one) and have the judge incorporate 
those limits into the case-management order. Id. 16, 26(f). 
 187. Professor Subrin suggests using as a target “realistic damages of over $500,000.” Subrin, 
supra note 116, at 400. I have no trouble with the figure he uses; any figure would draw an 
artificial line. It is not immediately clear to me, however, how a clerk of court, or even a judge, 
would determine what damages were “realistic” at the start of the suit or without 
communication with the parties, which then would cross back into the realm of judge-driven, 
differentiated case management. 
 188. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 178, at 1805–08 (elaborating a scheme that attempts to 
address many of these issues). 
 189. See Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in 
Controversy Cannot Be Determined from the Face of Plaintiff’s Complaint: The Need for Judicial 
and Statutory Reform to Preserve Defendant’s Equal Access to Federal Courts, 62 MO. L. REV. 
681, 686 (1997) (“Jurisdictional dilemmas arise in removal cases under two basic scenarios: (1) 
cases involving an indeterminate complaint . . . and (2) cases involving a ‘lowball’ 
complaint . . . .”). 
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would set for the simple-case track) and leave those “simple” cases in 
state court in the first place.190 
Even if there were sufficient numbers of “simple” cases in the 
federal system to justify a system-wide case-tracking scheme, that 
scheme would require effective allocation criteria. “The success of 
[tracking] is based in large measure on whether cases are correctly 
evaluated and assigned to the case-management tracks.”191 Experience 
has shown, however, that the types of objective data typically 
available at the start of the case—such as the stated amount in 
controversy or the nature of the suit as indicated by the plaintiff in 
the civil cover sheet—often are not very good predictors of how 
expensive the case will be or how long it will take.192 This does not 
make a tracking system inherently nonviable, but it does mean that 
informed tracking decisions will require court personnel (probably, 
but not necessarily, a judge) to elicit and consider additional 
information about the case.193 To the extent a judge performs this 
task, one might question the value of the tracking system. It would 
seem to require essentially the same level of judicial resources as 
 
 190. The policy questions about whether to retain diversity jurisdiction and, if so, where to 
set the amount-in-controversy requirement are well-known to this group and beyond the scope 
of this Article. Several authors have suggested specific reforms. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE U.S., supra note 58, at 29–32 (recommending measures “to seek reduction in the number of 
federal court proceedings in which jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship”); 1 FED. 
COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 13, at 454–58 (recommending “abolition of general diversity 
jurisdiction” with three exceptions: suits involving aliens, interpleader, and complex multistate 
litigation); AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND 
FEDERAL COURTS 12–14 (1969) (proposing amendments that would restrict diversity 
jurisdiction). For an overview of the arguments for and against diversity jurisdiction, see Larry 
Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 BYU L. REV. 97, 101–21 (providing an overview of the 
arguments for and against diversity jurisdiction). I do note that a proposal developed by the 
Federal-State Jurisdiction Committee is the subject of a bill pending in Congress that would 
provide for automatic increases to the amount-in-controversy requirement, in $5,000 
increments, by indexing increases to the Consumer Price Index. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction 
and Venue Clarification Act of 2009, H.R. 4113, 111th Cong. § 103. 
 191. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at 130; see also BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 177, at 16–17 (listing “[t]rack assignment” as a “Critical DCM 
Function[]”). 
 192. See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 163, at 46 (acknowledging “the difficulty in 
determining the correct track assignment for most civil litigation cases using data available at or 
soon after case filing”); Kakalik et al., supra note 162, at 28 (noting that “there was little actual 
‘differential’ tracking of general civil cases in most districts that adopted a track model in their 
CJRA plan”). 
 193. See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 163, at 49 (noting that even among the districts that 
adopted tracking systems, the majority of cases were tracked the same way, possibly alleviating 
very little judge involvement). 
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individual case-tailoring, thereby undermining one of the purposes of 
a systematic tracking scheme.194 But if the judge did no more than 
assign the case to a track, which still treats cases on a modified 
wholesale basis, the payoff would be less than if the judge had 
entered a custom-tailored case-management order. 
That point raises the more general point that tracking systems 
typically do not eliminate the need for judges to make case-by-case 
decisions about the needs of any particular case. Tracking system 
proposals typically either place the tracking decision with the judge 
initially or give the court authority to move cases from one track to 
another.195 They also typically allow the judge to alter the procedural 
restrictions applicable to a particular track.196 These powers would 
seem appropriate—if not necessary—to deal with situations in which 
the allocation criteria would yield a track assignment that was a poor 
fit for the particular case. But it interjects the trial court back into the 
process, with the tracking system operating not as a fixed rule but as a 
default. As Professor Maurice Rosenberg has noted, the success of 
tracking systems comes to depend on “skillful judicial case 
management.”197 That, in turn, raises the question of whether tracking 
with judicial tailoring works any better than having judges conduct 
differential case management (DCM) on a discretionary case-by-case 
basis by tailoring their scheduling orders. 
Proponents of tracking have suggested two reasons why tracking 
is beneficial even if it requires significant judicial involvement.198 
 
 194. See COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at 130 (“[U]nlike case 
management approaches that treat each case on an entirely individual basis, [tracking] provides 
systematic recognition of differences in case types and thus tries to conserve court resources by 
systematically tailoring their application.”). 
 195. See id. at 130–31 (detailing several common options for DCM track-assignment 
procedures); see also INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 
6 (noting that DCM systems with automated screening processes still require judges for 
reallocation); Cooper, supra note 178, at 1805 (noting that “simplified rules” do not apply “if the 
court, on motion or on its own, finds good cause to proceed under the regular rules”); Subrin, 
supra note 116, at 400 (including in his “simple track” proposal “a provision that for very good 
cause shown a party could move to be removed from the simple track”). 
 196. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at 131 (“[A]ll DCM systems 
preserve the discretion of the assigned judge to alter the previously chosen track or any of its 
predefined management controls as individual case needs evolve.”). 
 197. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 2212. 
 198. In the past, tracking systems were also said to promote the ability of courts to 
automatically track case progress to ensure that cases did not “fall through the cracks” of 
individualized case management. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at 
130. With the introduction of the Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (CM/ECF) system 
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Professor Subrin argues that tracking is better because it replaces a 
wholly ad hoc process with some standardization.199 Professor John 
Lande makes a similar point, saying that tracking provides structure 
to the differential case-management process.200 He also suggests that 
tracking sends a special signal to the parties about the court’s 
expectations for the case.201 
One could hardly contest the idea that like cases should be 
handled in like fashion, or that it is good for judges to clearly 
communicate their expectations to the litigants. The proposition that 
tracking achieves these virtues better than individual case 
management is, for me, not an obvious one. I can think of no clearer 
way for a judge to communicate his or her expectations of the parties 
than to hold a meaningful case-management conference and issue a 
detailed, custom-tailored case-management order. The 
standardization argument is harder to assess. It is no doubt true that 
judges vary in their case management. A tracking scheme, if it were 
consistently followed, would likely increase uniformity. But the main 
purpose of a tracking system is to match cases with their real 
procedural needs. If the system is to be limited to a manageable 
number of tracks, the match will always be a rough one because cases 
that are not exactly the same will be lumped together. Thus, the 
benefit of uniformity that comes from the standardized treatment of 
similar cases comes at the price of ignoring differences between the 
cases that individual case-tailoring could address. In other words, in 
the effort to stop the mismatches and disparities that might result 
from what Professor Subrin calls ad hoc case-tailoring, we might 
 
in federal courts, however, I assume that districts or individual judges have ample tools at their 
disposal to monitor case progress across the docket. 
 199. Subrin, supra note 116, at 401. 
 200. Lande, supra note 68, at 95 (“DCM builds on the process of individual case 
management by providing structure and expectations for the courts, attorneys, and litigants.”); 
see also DONNA STIENSTRA, MOLLY JOHNSON & PATRICIA LOMBARD, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE 
MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER 
THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990, at iii, 14–15 (1997) (discussing survey results from 
districts selected by Congress as demonstration districts due to their receptivity to case 
management and alternative dispute resolution and instructed to demonstrate how to make the 
techniques listed in the CJRA work). 
 201. Lande, supra note 68, at 95; see also STIENSTRA ET AL., supra note 200, at 14 (“[DCM] 
informs the attorneys about the judges’ expectations for cases of various types, and 
consequently attorneys are better prepared to discuss the case realistically at the first case 
management conference.”). 
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sacrifice the perfect matches that custom case-tailoring delivers when 
done well. 
In the end, the CJRA experiment failed to provide much 
meaningful data on whether tracking systems could efficiently, fairly, 
or uniformly perform the differential case management of civil cases 
in federal court. In large part, this is because too few districts and 
judges utilized it often enough to provide a data set sufficient to 
support empirically valid conclusions.202 Of the ten pilot districts that 
were required to implement DCM, four of them rejected tracking and 
continued to rely on individual case management.203 Of the six pilot 
districts that adopted tracking systems, most of them either failed to 
use them or assigned virtually all of their cases to the “standard” 
track.204 
Because of the paucity of data, the RAND report declined to 
draw any conclusions about the potential for tracking to reduce cost 
and delay in the federal courts.205 We are left, then, to speculate about 
why the CJRA tracking experiment failed. One conclusion might be 
that, outside of the easy pickings like administrative appeals and 
student loan cases, there simply are not many cases that both qualify 
for federal subject-matter jurisdiction and do not warrant the 
application of general procedure. Alternatively, it may be that we just 
cannot identify these cases based on the information available at or 
near the time of filing. Either of these reasons would severely 
undermine the value of a tracking system in federal court. On the 
other hand, the results of the CJRA experiment may simply show that 
the federal judiciary, which did not like being told by Congress how 
to do its job, simply dug in its heels and never gave tracking a fighting 
chance.206 
In its Final Report to Congress on the CJRA, the Judicial 
Conference enthusiastically endorsed the notion of DCM but 
recommended that the choice between tracking and individual-judge 
 
 202. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 402. Professor Subrin raises this point to deflect the 
argument that case tracking under the CJRA was not validated empirically, concluding that it 
was “[t]he failure of Federal District Court Judges to permit empirical study of tracking” that 
caused the data gap. Id. 
 203. KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 163, at 45. 
 204. Id. at 49. 
 205. Id. at 45–46. 
 206. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 402 (“The failure of Federal District Court Judges to 
permit empirical study of tracking makes the argument of adopting a simple track system only 
after empirical study all the more hollow.”). 
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discretion be left to each district.207 The Judicial Conference explained 
that “[m]any courts found that it is easier and less bureaucratic for 
individual judges to establish individual DCM schedules based on the 
characteristics of cases.”208 Of course, the fact that judges prefer to 
tailor cases according to their own judging styles or according to their 
own views of the needs of those cases does not prove that tracking is 
an inferior method of differentiating cases. One might view the 
preferences of judges as reflecting a valid but as-yet-unconfirmed 
intuition that tailoring is better done ex post by judges than ex ante 
by committees. A less charitable view might be that it evidences 
nothing more than that judges prefer doing things their own way 
whenever they can. 
c. Simplified Rules.  The final alternative to a single set of 
transsubstantive rules is to create a set of simplified rules for “simple” 
cases. This alternative is essentially a variant of the tracking system 
reduced to two tracks. It responds most directly to the 
“Cadillac/Chevy” problem, operating on the premise that we can 
keep the Cadillac rules so long as we also have a set of Chevy rules 
for all of the “simple” cases. As the IAALS put it, the one-size-fits-all 
approach of the Civil Rules “is bloated and has no scaled-down 
version for cases demanding less expenditure.”209 There does appear 
to be significant interest in the notion of simplified rules, including at 
the federal level. Professor Subrin remains a vocal proponent of 
creating a simple-case track in the federal court system.210 In the FJC’s 
Civil Rules Survey, over 60 percent of the respondents either agreed 
or strongly agreed with the proposition that the federal courts should 
test simplified rules (with party consent) in a few select districts.211 
Several years ago, Professor Ed Cooper, Reporter for the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, prepared a draft of what a set of 
simplified rules might look like. In his version, the hallmarks of 
simplified procedure were more-detailed pleading, increased 
disclosure obligations, and reduced discovery.212 Others have 
 
 207. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 41, at 28 (recommending that each 
district select either “the more rigid track model or the judicial discretion model”). 
 208. Id. at 27. 
 209. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 6. 
 210. Subrin, supra note 116, at 398–405. 
 211. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 77, at 54. 
 212. See Cooper, supra note 178, at 1796 (“The draft proposes more detailed pleading, 
enhanced disclosure obligations, and restricted discovery opportunities.”). 
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suggested that simplified procedure should also reduce or eliminate 
judicial case management.213 
The fate of simplified rules is linked closely to the fate of broader 
tracking systems, at least in the federal system.214 How many “Chevy” 
cases are there in the federal system? What criteria do we use to 
identify them?215 Do we create a mechanism to opt back into the 
“Cadillac” rules? Can a party do that unilaterally? Is judicial action 
required? And, ultimately, is there any reason to think that, in the 
aggregate, we can get a better fit at a better price by implementing a 
slotting mechanism than we can get by bespoke tailoring from a single 
set of rules via individual case management? Professor Cooper notes 
this issue in his article exploring the draft simplified rules: 
Even if there is reason to fear that general federal procedure should 
not apply in all its sweep to every case in federal court, it is not clear 
that “general federal procedure” is as procrustean as the champions 
of simplified procedure may claim. The Civil Rules provide many 
opportunities for tailoring procedure to the realistic needs of 
individual actions.216 
 
 213. See Stephen N. Subrin, Reflections on the Twin Dreams of Simplified Procedure and 
Useful Empiricism, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 176 (2007) (suggesting “more detailed pleading, 
mandatory disclosure, reduced discovery, reduced or no judicial case management (including 
conferences), time limits on discovery and motions, and firm trial dates”); Subrin, supra note 
116, at 399 (advocating limiting discovery, eliminating multiple pretrial conferences, and setting 
a firm trial date). 
 214. The story in the state court systems might be much different. First, states already 
employ this technique with small claims courts. Second, state courts of general jurisdiction 
presumably will have a large number of cases that have lower monetary stakes and that do not 
implicate civil rights or present other policy issues that might justify litigation under the full set 
of rules. 
 215. One way of eliminating the problem of selecting cases for a “fast track” is to have an 
optional system that the parties must opt for if they wish to use it. See Richard McMillan, Jr. & 
David B. Siegel, Creating a Fast-Track Alternative Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 431, 431 (1985) (calling for “a faster track judicial system—which 
takes the basic principles of the ADR movement, i.e., that parties can voluntarily agree to much 
less costly procedures for resolving disputes if given the opportunity, and applies such principles 
to traditional court-supervised litigation”). One might fairly question the need for an optional 
“fast track”; the parties can create their own “fast track” by simply agreeing to limit their 
pretrial activities and to move quickly. As McMillan and Siegel note, however, that process 
requires the parties to agree on many things over a long period of time, whereas an optional 
“fast track” would only require them to agree once. Id. at 439 (“They need not negotiate the 
procedures by which that compromise will be achieved; judicial rules are already in place.”). 
 216. Cooper, supra note 178, at 1798. 
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3. The Path Forward.  I do not know of anyone who thinks that 
every case should get exactly the same pretrial procedure—that is, 
that every case warrants the same amount of time for discovery, the 
same amount and range of discovery, and so on. Put another way, 
nobody thinks that the Advisory Committee should develop a single, 
fixed playbook of scripted procedures to be applied mechanically and 
without alteration to all cases, from the most complex antitrust class 
action to the most pedestrian slip-and-fall diversity case. Different 
cases will continue to have different pretrial needs. 
The current Civil Rules scheme attempts to achieve that kind of 
differentiation. It does so, despite having the same general set of rules 
for all cases, by providing options for the parties and by empowering 
trial courts to custom-fit the pretrial process to the needs of the case. 
In that respect, I reject the “one-size-fits-all” label, which fails to 
account for the tailoring that judges do. “One set of rules” does not 
mean “one size fits all” when the set of rules in question provides 
ample management options. 
That being said, there is nothing in the Rules Enabling Act that 
dictates that we have only one set of rules in federal court. We can 
have different rules for different subjects (though subject-specific 
rules would present their own questions under the Rules Enabling 
Act and certainly would interject a new dimension of politics into the 
rulemaking process).217 We can create different tracks for cases with 
different characteristics. Some districts already have them under their 
local rules. We can adopt the lesser form of tracking by creating a 
separate set of simplified rules for some set of “simple” cases. All of 
these options could still include case management for further custom 
tailoring. The objective of these options is not to eliminate case 
management completely but to become less dependent on it. 
I think it is fair to say that everyone agrees that federal judges 
could do a better job of utilizing their current case-management 
powers. But before asking (or demanding) that they do so, we must 
first pause to consider, again, whether the system should rely less on 
case management, not more. If the answer is that the system should 
be less dependent on case management, then some type of departure 
from the “one set of rules” scheme would seem to be required. At the 
same time, I think the burden is squarely on those who would depart 
from the “one set of rules” model to show that the structures they 
 
 217. See supra notes 128–34, 145–46 and accompanying text. 
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would emplace would do a better job of fitting the procedure to the 
case than judges currently can do with their tailors’ tools. 
C. Do Federal Judges Wield Too Much Discretion? 
In general, the Civil Rules rely heavily on judicial discretion, and 
the case-management rules are no exception. This is particularly true 
with respect to discovery management, in which district judges wield 
wide discretionary power to regulate the scope, sequence, timing, and 
methods of discovery. This Section addresses the concern raised by 
some that the combination of the transsubstantive rules scheme and 
the case-management ethos has resulted in too many important 
matters being left to the trial court’s discretion. 
“Discretion lay at the heart of Pound’s jurisprudence.”218 It also 
lies at the heart of case management. Enamored of the benefits of the 
equity system, the original drafters of the Civil Rules opted for a set 
of rules that relied on flexibility and discretion.219 The members of the 
original Advisory Committee knew that an equity-based system 
would require a strong judicial hand but nonetheless rejected many 
proposals that would have reined in the process.220 Amendments to 
Rules 16 and 26 since then have increased judicial control but have 
done so flexibly, continuing what Professor David Shapiro has called 
“the tradition of discretion.”221 
Discretion is a byproduct of both the transsubstantive nature of 
the Civil Rules and the fact that the chief architects of the original 
rules were reacting to the costs of inflexibility that manifested in prior 
procedural schemes.222 As Professor Subrin has pointed out, our 
commitment to having one set of rules for all cases has caused us to 
write the Civil Rules with a large degree of generality and to delegate 
 
 218. Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 521 (2006). 
 219. See Subrin, supra note 117, at 943–75 (detailing the judicial philosophies of the 
drafters). Ironically, if 1938 marked the beginning of the era of procedural discretion, it also 
marked the end of the era of substantive discretion with Erie Railroad. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938), and the end of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See Marcus, supra note 
19, at 1576–77 (noting that federal courts could no longer decide for themselves which 
substantive rules to apply in diversity cases). 
 220. Subrin, supra note 117, at 975–82 (noting several proposals rejected by the Advisory 
Committee that would have put constraints in place). 
 221. Shapiro, supra note 18, at 1985. 
 222. See Burbank, supra note 121, at 543–44 (“[T]he chief architects of the original 1938 
Federal Rules were steeped in knowledge of the costs of inflexibility associated with common 
law and code procedure . . . .”). 
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the details of their application to the trial judge’s discretion.223 In 
other words, the Civil Rules often eschew detailed controls in favor of 
general policies that guide discretionary application on a case-by-case 
basis.224 
Many commentators think the Civil Rules already place too 
much discretionary power in the hands of federal judges.225 Professor 
Resnik was one of the first to sound the cautionary note that case 
management often entails activities that, being less visible and often 
unreviewable, carry greater risks of abuse of authority.226 As she puts 
it, “Transforming the judge from adjudicator to manager substantially 
expands the opportunities for judges to use—or to abuse—their 
powers.”227 Professor Donald Elliott echoes this concern that judicial 
case management gives judges discretionary power to act without 
procedural safeguards.228 Most recently, Professor Jay Tidmarsh has 
raised his own fears about case management and abuse of power.229 
Others criticize discretion on more practical grounds. Professor 
Bone questions the competence of federal trial judges to exercise 
discretion.230 In part, he is echoing Judge Easterbrook’s critique of 
 
 223. Subrin, supra note 92, at 44; Subrin, supra note 116, at 391. 
 224. See Cooper, supra note 178, at 1795 (“The effort is less to provide detailed controls and 
more to establish general policies that guide discretionary application on a case-specific basis.”). 
 225. See, e.g., Peterson, supra note 3, at 76 (“Unconstrained by precedent, unreviewed by 
appellate judges, and unchecked by the involvement of juries, district judges are free to manage 
cases as they wish.”). Another author has offered a similar critique of the English procedural 
reforms implemented in the wake of the Woolf Report. See Michael Zander, The Woolf 
Reforms: What’s the Verdict?, in THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES TEN YEARS ON, supra note 11, 
at 417, 429 (“The inevitable price of giving the court a wide discretion is that one loses the 
advantage of predictability upon which so much in a legal system depends.”). 
 226. Resnik, supra note 3, at 380; see also Resnik, supra note 136, at 548 (“I am deeply 
skeptical of the capacity of individual judges to craft rules on a case-by-case basis.”). 
 227. Resnik, supra note 27, at 54 (arguing that case-management activities are standardless 
and effectively unreviewable); see also Resnik, supra note 87, at 221 (arguing for public judging 
activities as a check on state power). 
 228. Elliott, supra note 1, at 317 (“It seems beyond serious debate, then, that discretionary 
managerial decisions may influence the outcome of litigation in ways that are arbitrary because 
judges act without the procedural safeguards that accompany decisions on the merits.”). 
 229. See Tidmarsh, supra note 218, at 559 (“Customizing rules for each case also raises a 
concern of great significance in a democratic society: the fear that judges will use their 
discretionary power, consciously or subconsciously, to tailor rules in a way that influences the 
outcome of individual litigation.”). 
 230. Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2007) (“The pervasive assumption that expert trial judges can do a good job 
of tailoring procedures to individual cases is empirically unsupported and at best highly 
questionable.”); Bone, supra note 140, at 301 (“This degree of trial judge subjectivity and 
decisional variance is highly undesirable.”). 
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case management, writing: “I am skeptical about the value of broad 
discretion because I have grave doubts that trial judges can gather 
and process the information necessary to craft case-specific 
procedures that produce good outcomes in the highly strategic 
environment of litigation.”231 He also worries that individual judges 
are at risk of succumbing to cognitive biases.232 According to Bone, a 
more detailed scheme of rules would force the rulemakers to grapple 
in advance with many of the issues now left to individual judges; as a 
group, Bone contends, the rulemakers would be less susceptible to 
cognitive biases when addressing those issues.233 
Professor Tidmarsh is even more pessimistic in his assessment of 
the practical benefits of discretionary case management. According to 
him, reliance on discretion has predictable consequences: expense, 
delay, unpredictability, and abuse of power.234 To put it more plainly, 
he contends that discretionary case management is 
counterproductive—that it causes expense.235 In this respect, Tidmarsh 
associates expense and delay with the adversarial litigation culture, 
and he thinks that a scheme that leaves matters to discretionary 
resolution by the judge simply creates yet another level of 
gamesmanship.236 
Critics of discretion see several possible solutions. One 
solution—already explored in Section B.2—is to have more than one 
set of rules. Professor Burbank, for example, has long argued that 
substance-specific rules that provide more detailed guidance—and 
constraints—are preferable to transsubstantive rules that rely on 
judicial discretion.237 
Another proposed solution is to demand that the Civil Rules, 
even if applicable to all cases, provide more detail and guidance. 
 
 231. Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. 
REV. 1155, 1170 (2006). 
 232. Bone, supra note 230, at 1989 (“These predictions too are prone to cognitive bias.”). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Tidmarsh, supra note 218, at 558. 
 235. Id. at 559 (“The savings or reductions in delay that case management achieves in one 
case were often offset by increased expenses or greater delays of additional customized 
procedures in another.”). 
 236. Id. at 535 (“[D]iscretionary procedure creates a new level of gamesmanship—arguing 
not only over questions of compliance with procedural rules but also over the very rules to 
apply.”). 
 237. See Burbank, supra note 138, at 1936–37 (criticizing a system where “substance-specific 
procedures and empirical investigation of supposedly neutral rules are anathema” and citing 
evidence that “furnishes reasons to be concerned about discretionary justice”). 
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Professor Bone, for example, thinks that the rulemakers use 
discretion to duck hard choices. He thinks the rulemakers have been 
reluctant to squarely and openly resolve difficult questions, and as a 
result have “kicked the can down the road” by placing the resolution 
of those questions within trial courts’ discretion.238 The result, 
according to Bone, is that those difficult questions get answered not 
through the public rulemaking process but through individual case 
adjudication, a forum that is less visible, less transparent, and not 
subject to public debate.239 Bone speculates, perhaps too cynically, 
that one reason for this is that judges dominate the rulemaking 
process and discretion maximizes their individual power.240 
But there may be very good reasons for committing matters to 
trial judges’ discretion. Reflecting on the use of discretion, Professor 
Cooper observed, 
Discretion is a useful rulemaking technique when it is difficult—as it 
almost always is—to foresee even the most important problems and 
to determine their wise resolution. Reliance on discretion is 
vindicated only when district judges and magistrate judges use it 
wisely most of the time and in most cases. The ongoing revisions of 
the Civil Rules time and again reflect an implicit judgment that 
confidence is well placed in the discretionary exercise of power by 
federal trial judges.241 
 
 238. See Bone, supra note 230, at 1974 (“[D]elegating discretion allows rulemakers to dodge 
difficult and controversial normative choices by handing them to trial judges in individual cases, 
where they are less transparent and less likely to trigger public debate.”). 
 239. Id. (“It is much easier for rulemakers to compromise on a general rule that leaves the 
controversial issues to the discretion of the trial judge than to resolve the disagreement at the 
level of drafting the general rule itself.”). 
 240. See id. (“[J]udges have come to dominate membership on the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee in recent years and judges tend to favor broad discretion. Discretion gives them 
more control over their own courtrooms and cases, and makes judging more interesting and 
potentially more rewarding.” (footnotes omitted)). Other scholars have further addressed this 
hypothesis. Compare Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of 
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 627 (1994) (“[T]he rules of procedure are formulated by 
judges. If the self-interest of those judges conflicts with the efficiency criterion, it would seem 
plausible that the judges will formulate procedural rules that further their own interests rather 
than the interests of efficiency.”), with Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and 
Procedural Rules, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647, 647 (1994) (disputing the hypothesis). 
 241. Cooper, supra note 178, at 1795. I am indebted to Judge Rosenthal for tipping me off to 
this quote about whether federal judges are worthy of the discretion they have: “Procedures for 
effective judicial administration presuppose a federal judiciary composed of judges well-
equipped and of sturdy character in whom may safely be vested, as is already, a wide range of 
judicial discretion, subject to appropriate review on appeal.” Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. 
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959) (discussing discretion in the context of abstention). 
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Professor Marcus, a longtime consultant to the Advisory Committee 
and now the Co-Reporter, also defends the use of discretion in the 
Civil Rules. While he agrees that there is a theoretical possibility that 
trial judges will use their discretion to promote individual substantive 
agendas, he notes that there is little real evidence that trial judges 
have been doing so.242 Indeed, he supposes, the fact that discretionary 
case management continues to enjoy strong support from lawyers 
from all parts of the bar suggests that the theoretical possibility of 
agenda pushing is not being felt on the ground.243 Professor Marcus is 
also skeptical about the alternatives to discretion in case 
management, saying that proposed remedies, such as added appellate 
review or making the pretrial rules more rigid, are no better, and are 
likely worse.244  
It is not just current rulemaking “insiders” who find value in 
discretion. In his article assessing Rule 16, Professor Shapiro wrote, 
[T]he rulemakers were right in believing that significant discretion 
should be delegated—that the frequent use of ‘may’ was a wise 
decision. This is so not only because the Rule was an innovative one, 
but because cases vary in ways that are difficult to spell out in 
advance, because judges vary in their ability and willingness to make 
effective use of such techniques, and because ‘local legal cultures’ 
vary in their receptiveness to certain techniques and practices.245 
Ultimately, one cannot say in any categorical sense that 
discretion in the rules is “good” or “bad.” Judgments like that depend 
on issues of degree and context. In his seminal analysis of procedural 
discretion, Professor Rosenberg explained that there are good 
reasons and bad reasons for conferring procedural discretion on trial 
judges.246 In the context of rule formulation, building discretion into a 
rule is proper if the subject cannot be helpfully reduced to more 
 
 242. Marcus, supra note 1, at 1607. 
 243. Id. at 1611 (“[L]awyers’ enthusiasm for giving [judges] more [discretion] suggests that 
we have not reached a point where that discretion is abused with great frequency.”). 
 244. Id. at 1611–12 (pointing to experiences with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as 
cautioning against efforts to use rigid schedules to combat the allegedly inconsistent application 
of discretionary rules). 
 245. Shapiro, supra note 18, at 1995. 
 246. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 660–65 (1971). In this article, Professor Rosenberg distinguishes 
between primary discretion, which involves the power to create the governing standard, and 
secondary, or “limited review,” discretion, in which the trial court follows existing standards 
with limited appellate review of the trial judge’s choices. Id. at 637. 
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particularized guidance because it would be impracticable—if not 
impossible—to anticipate and address all of the situations that might 
arise under the rule.247 In contrast, neither the drive for efficiency or 
finality, nor a desire to boost trial-judge morale, would properly 
warrant giving trial judges discretionary power.248 Professor 
Rosenberg stresses that rulemakers must be careful only to confer 
discretion for the right reasons.249 And even when discretion is 
appropriate, the rulemakers should, to the extent possible, state the 
degree of discretion given, set some boundaries, or at least articulate 
some guiding principles.250 
I take Professor Bone to be making essentially the same points 
when he says that “[r]ulemakers should treat case-specific discretion 
as an explicit policy choice rather than an implicit default, evaluate its 
costs and benefits in each procedural context, and make a considered 
judgment about how much discretion to grant and what controls or 
guidelines to include.”251 I wholeheartedly agree with those views. 
Moreover, my personal view, contrary to Bone’s assessment,252 is that 
the Advisory Committee has, at least in modern times, followed that 
prescription quite faithfully. Nonetheless, the point remains an 
important one, and the rulemakers must be sure to keep it in mind as 
they consider new proposals that would rely even more on 
discretionary judgment to resolve cases fairly and efficiently. 
But it is not my aim here to propose a definitive answer to 
whether the Civil Rules already have too much discretion built into 
them, or to whether the discretion that does exist in case management 
alleviates or exacerbates the cost and delay issues to which they are 
addressed.253 For present purposes, the important point is simply to 
 
 247. Id. at 662–63. A second “good” reason for discretion recognized by Professor 
Rosenberg was that the trial judge, by virtue of “being there” at the time and having the benefit 
of seeing a fuller picture of the events, would be in better position than a reviewing court to 
decide the issue. Id. at 663. This reason for discretion, however, speaks more to appellate review 
standards than to the level of detail with which the trial court rules should be written. 
 248. Id. at 660–62. 
 249. Id. at 667. 
 250. Id. at 659. 
 251. Bone, supra note 230, at 2002. 
 252. See id. at 1964–65 (“I propose that the Advisory Committee justify in explicit terms 
how much discretion to delegate and in what form. In that regard, the Committee should review 
the various methods for limiting or channeling discretion.”). 
 253. In this Article, I am not addressing whether it is appropriate to give trial judges 
discretion to determine whether a claim has been adequately pleaded, even though that can be 
said to be a form of case management. There certainly may be areas where judicial discretion (as 
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emphasize that any reform efforts that would lean even more heavily 
on case management must account for the concerns of some that 
federal judges already exercise a dangerous amount of discretion. 
Many—including, it seems, the majority of the practicing bar—see 
increased case management as a key part of solving the problems of 
excess cost and delay. That might mean giving federal judges more 
discretionary case-management powers. It certainly means getting 
federal judges to more actively use the discretionary case-
management powers they already have. Given the highly 
discretionary nature of case management under the Civil Rules, 
either would result in more discretionary decisionmaking. For the 
critics of the current model, that would mean more of a bad thing. 
D. Can Case Management Solve the “Cost Problem” by  
Itself (If at All)? 
The previous Sections addressed objections to the case-
management model, ranging from the concern that managerial 
judging is eroding the nature of judging to the criticism that our 
reliance on case management is a symptom of a critical flaw in our 
one-size-fits-all rules scheme—that by trying to do too much it fails to 
meaningfully answer policy questions and therefore must submerge 
those questions by punting them to ad hoc decisionmaking by 
individual judges. In this Section, I assume that the case-management 
model is sound procedural policy and ask whether other aspects of the 
federal pretrial scheme must change for it to succeed. I begin with a 
quick review of the competing views regarding the effectiveness of 
case management generally. I then consider two types of reforms to 
the federal pretrial scheme that might improve the effectiveness of 
case management. The first type is structural reform. Are there ways 
to change or add to the existing pretrial scheme to facilitate effective 
case management? The second type of reform is cultural. Is the 
answer to the problem of excess cost and delay to have more or 
 
opposed to judgment) is not warranted, and one of those areas is at the stage of determining the 
sufficiency of the pleadings. As Professor Miller points out in his paper for the Duke 
Conference, there is no small irony that the Supreme Court seems to have entrusted the same 
trial judges who reportedly cannot use their judgment and discretion to manage cases with 
making pleadings decisions based on their judgment and experience. See Miller, supra note 4, at 
59–60 (“It is curious that, in the same opinions, the Court entrusted district judges with the 
freedom to use judicial experience and common sense to dismiss a claim at genesis for 
noncompliance with a plausibility-pleading requirement, but . . . denied them the freedom to 
manage the early phases of their cases . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
GENSLER IN PRINTER PROOF 11/29/2010  7:00:19 PM 
2010] JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT 727 
different rules, or is it to change the overly adversarial culture of 
litigation, particularly in discovery? 
1. Case Management as a Cure for Undue Cost and Delay.  
Depending on who one asks, case management is either an effective 
tonic for undue cost and delay or a snake-oil solution that is doomed 
to leave the patient sick. Over twenty years ago, Judge Easterbrook 
pronounced that case management cannot work because judges lack 
the information needed to distinguish between “good” discovery and 
“bad” discovery.254 Professor Bone and Professor Martin Redish share 
Judge Easterbrook’s skepticism.255 Professor Paul Stancil offers a 
different kind of law-and-economics critique, arguing that case-
management solutions are doomed to fail because judges have 
incentives to minimize their workloads by leaving discovery to the 
parties.256 Based on the oral argument in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,257 it would 
seem that some of the Justices are skeptical of case management as a 
cost-control scheme because it places too much reliance on the wise 
exercise of discretion by hundreds of different trial-level judges.258 
 
 254. Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 638–39. 
 255. Bone, supra note 142, at 899–900 (“The Twombly Court’s skepticism is in fact well 
justified. Serious litigation problems should not be left to trial judge discretion as much as they 
are today. Judges face information and other constraints that impair their ability to manage 
optimally, especially in the highly strategic environment of litigation.”); Martin H. Redish, 
Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 603–04 (2001) (arguing that 
proportionality limits are impractical because the trial court is not in a good position to assess 
whether the desired information is worth the cost). 
 256. Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 96–97 (2009). 
McMillan and Siegel offer a similar, though less cynical, view:  
These problems cannot be solved merely by asking our judicial system to “try 
harder.” Recent amendments to the Civil Rules have tended to fall short because 
they merely permit rather than require better case management by judges. Judges 
have been too easily diverted from exercising their new discretionary authority. As a 
result, quicker and cheaper justice continues to be dispensed erratically, if at all, in 
many jurisdictions. This is an institutional problem, which no amount of well-
intentioned exhortation is likely to correct. 
McMillan & Siegel, supra note 215, at 437–38. 
 257. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 258. See Oral Argument at 34:34, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 2008 WL 5168391 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2008) 
(No. 07-1015) (Scalia, J.), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2008/2008_07_1015/
argument (“Well, I mean, that’s lovely: That the ability of the Attorney General and the 
Director of the FBI to—to do their jobs without having to litigate personal liability is dependent 
upon the discretionary decision of a single district judge. I mean, I thought that the protection of 
qualified immunity gave them—gave them more than that.”). In response to the idea that high-
level federal officials could be protected from excessive discovery by trial court orders staying 
discovery as to them while other aspects of the case proceeded, Justice Alito remarked, “How 
many district judges are there in the country? Over 600. One of the district judges has a very 
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But not everyone views case management as a failure. Though 
Professor Elliott viewed the need for case management as proof that 
the Civil Rules suffered from a design flaw, he nonetheless was 
persuaded that case management could in fact reduce delay and 
expense.259 The Judicial Conference’s Civil Litigation Management 
Manual makes a special point of stating that, although it is true that 
the lawyers will know more about the case than the judge, that fact 
“should not deter [judges] . . . from management, based on [their] 
experience and after consultation with counsel.”260 And Professor 
Miller, though interested in pursuing supplemental reforms and not 
wholly satisfied with the current state of affairs, remains committed to 
the case-management model: 
Abandoning what has been developed over the years is not a 
rational option, and nothing in the Federal Judicial Center’s 
empirical work referred to earlier suggests it should be. A district or 
magistrate judge, through his or her control over scheduling and the 
discovery process, represents the best—if not the only—hope in the 
procedural arsenal for containing excessive litigation behavior and 
the type of attrition activity that breeds cost and delay, especially in 
large-scale cases.261 
In his critique of Rule 16, which he faults for being too detailed,262 
Professor Michael Tigar nonetheless stresses the importance of case 
management to (1) prompt settlement before parties incur discovery 
costs, (2) get control of discovery early to focus and limit discovery 
and to send the message to parties to “quit messing around,” and (3) 
structure an iterative process that looks to resolve critical issues first 
when possible and holds off on discovery of the rest until those are 
resolved.263 
 
aggressive idea about what the discovery should be. What’s the protection there?” Id. at 49:05 
(Alito, J.). 
 259. Elliott, supra note 1, at 315–16. 
 260. COMM. ON COURT ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 69, at 28. 
 261. Miller, supra note 4, at 115. 
 262. Michael E. Tigar, Pretrial Case Management under the Amended Rules: Too Many 
Words for a Good Idea, 14 REV. LITIG. 137, 138 (1994) (“[T]here has been, particularly in the 
past decade, such tinkering and fiddling with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the 
rulemakers themselves are defeating the objective of a ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action.’ The 1993 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
16 . . . is a symptom of this meddling.” (footnote omitted)). 
 263. Id. at 152–54. 
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Debate about the ability of case management to reduce cost and 
delay is nothing new, nor is it unique to the United States.264 But it 
remains critically important. One of the focuses of the latest wave of 
empirical studies is to determine whether case management has 
fulfilled its promise. If case management does not help at all, or, as 
Professor Tidmarsh recently suggested, it turns out to be 
counterproductive,265 then we need to quickly start taking steps to 
turn around the battleship. But even if we assume that case 
management works, that does not end the reform debate. One can be 
a supporter of case management and still advocate other reforms. It is 
one thing to say that case management helps; it is a quite different 
thing to say that case management is enough by itself. Thus, even 
some of the staunchest supporters of the case-management model 
believe that complementary reforms are needed. 
2. Structural Reforms to Facilitate Case Management.  In this 
Section, I explore various proposals for enhancing case management 
by altering the existing pretrial structure. One approach might be to 
pair aggressive case management with aggressive structural reforms 
to the existing pleading and discovery system. Proponents of the more 
aggressive structural reforms can draw strength from signs that the 
Supreme Court has lost faith in the ability of case management, by 
itself, to control cost and delay. In its now legendary decision in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,266 the Supreme Court questioned, for the 
first time, whether the case-management reforms of the past three 
 
 264. Professor Zander, the most vocal critic of the 1998 English Civil Practice Rules adopted 
in the wake of the Woolf Report, has opposed those reforms on the basis that their increased 
reliance on case management will increase cost and delay, rather than reduce it. See Zander, 
supra note 225, at 420–21, 424–28 (relying in part on the 1996 RAND Study). In general, 
though, English reformers seem to take the other side of the debate and continue to support 
case management. Lord Jackson gave a particularly strong endorsement of the benefits of case 
management in his 2009 review of civil litigation costs, saying, 
All the feedback which I have received during the Costs Review indicates that 
(despite academic skepticism) both costs and time are saved by good case 
management. By good case management, I mean that a judge of relevant expertise 
takes a grip on the case, identifies the issues and gives directions which are focused 
upon the early resolution of those issues. I accept that this evidence is anecdotal, 
although it is supported by my own experience both as a barrister and as a judge. 
LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, supra note 11, at 394. 
 265. Tidmarsh, supra note 218, at 559. 
 266. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
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decades would effectively deal with cost and delay issues.267 As partial 
justification for holding that pleadings must include plausible grounds 
for inferring the required elements of the claims in question, Justice 
Souter parroted Judge Easterbrook’s skepticism: 
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement 
to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery 
process through “careful case management” given the common 
lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery 
abuse has been on the modest side.268 
Twombly represents access-based reform.269 It operates from the 
premise that if the pretrial scheme cannot control the cost of cases 
once they get to discovery, then the only way to control cost is to stop 
cases from getting to discovery in the first place. But while Twombly 
certainly appears to opt for access-based cost control over case 
management, I do not read the case as asserting categorically that 
case management does not work. Rather, I take the Supreme Court’s 
meaning to be that case management does not adequately protect 
defendants from groundless claims. But what about claims that the 
Court thinks should survive the pleadings stage? I find nothing in 
Twombly to suggest that the Court has lost faith in the ability of 
judicial case management to find the right balance of pretrial 
activities and costs in those cases. Indeed, in that context, the Court 
may well subscribe to the view, voiced in dissent by Justice Stevens in 
Twombly, that federal judges have a vast “case-management arsenal” 
to combat “sprawling, costly, and hugely time-consuming” 
discovery.270 After all, it was not that long ago—1987 to be precise—
when the Supreme Court seemed to express greater faith in the 
ability of case management to control cost, remarking that “[j]udicial 
 
 267. Id. at 559; see also Bone, supra note 142, at 898–99 (stating that Twombly was the first 
case in which the Supreme Court had questioned the effectiveness of the case-management 
approach to dealing with cost and delay issues); supra note 258. 
 268. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (citing Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 638 (citation omitted)). 
The Twombly Court’s reliance on Judge Easterbrook’s article has been criticized. See Burbank, 
supra note 121, at 559 n.108. So too has Judge Easterbrook’s article. See Carrington, supra note 
145, at 628. 
 269. See Bone, supra note 142, at 876 (“[This article] views Twombly not so much as a 
pleading decision but rather as a court access decision, one that addresses a general problem of 
institutional design: how best to prevent undesirable lawsuits from entering the court system.”); 
see also Burbank, supra note 121, at 561 (discussing Twombly’s effect on court access); A. 
Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 368 
(2010) (locating Twombly as part of a larger movement to restrict access to justice). 
 270. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 593 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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supervision of discovery should always seek to minimize its costs and 
inconvenience and to prevent improper uses of discovery requests.”271 
The IAALS is one of the groups urging structural reform to 
control the cost of discovery. It advocates fact-based pleading.272 The 
stated purpose of this proposed reform is cost control. As explained 
in the Final Report issued jointly by the IAALS and the ACTL, “One 
of the primary criticisms of notice pleading is that it leads to more 
discovery than is necessary to identify and prepare for a valid legal 
dispute.”273 In principle, the notion that more detailed pleading can 
help focus discovery seems self-evident and is worth serious 
consideration. It seeks to build upon case management by providing 
judges with better information to do the job.274 
The IAALS and the ACTL have taken pains lately to distance 
themselves from the plausibility test of Twombly275 and Iqbal276 and 
also to emphasize that the point of their proposal urging fact-based 
pleading is not to limit court access but to control discovery. This is an 
important distinction. At a theoretical level, it ultimately suggests the 
concept of decoupling the pleading requirements of Rule 8 from the 
dismissal standard of Rule 12. In other words, it raises the possibility 
that one might require fact-based pleading for case-management 
purposes but still test the sufficiency of pleadings against some lesser 
metric.277 That notion is, in many ways, akin to revitalizing practice 
 
 271. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 546 
(1987). 
 272. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., supra note 80, at 5; INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS, supra note 
104, at 3 (“The party that bears the burden of proof . . . must plead with particularity all material 
facts that are known to that party that support that claim or affirmative defense and each 
remedy sought . . . .”). 
 273. AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL 
SYS., supra note 80, at 5. 
 274. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. 
LEGAL SYS., REPORT FROM THE TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND CIVIL JUSTICE 4–7 (2010) 
(“[E]arly disclosure of known material facts should not be difficult . . . and should result in early 
narrowing of the issues . . . . [O]ur Principles are meant to encourage use of our civil justice 
system by those who . . . are foreclosed due to excessive delay and expense.”); see also Rebecca 
Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton, Reinvigorating Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 245, 279 (2010) (“The introduction of facts at the pleading stage will help the judge 
identify the specific issues in dispute, which in turn will increase the judge’s ability to make 
comprehensive and informed decisions about the scope of discovery and pretrial practice.”). 
 275. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560–61. 
 276. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944, 1949 (2009). 
 277. Although the IAALS disclaims any intent to restrict court access based on the 
pleadings, their main pleading-reform proposal may in fact result in additional dismissals at the 
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under Rule 12(e), which allows a party who must respond to a 
pleading to ask that the pleader be required to provide a “more 
definite statement,”278 but with a critical twist. In this context, the 
reason for requiring additional detail is not to enable the other party 
to answer or to file a motion testing the pleadings but to generate 
inputs for effective case management.279 
A different type of structural reform designed to complement 
case management would be to create case-management protocols for 
different types of cases. The idea is that committees composed of 
judges, academics, lawyers from all sides of the bar, and other 
interested persons could, for any particular type of case, develop a 
protocol setting forth nonbinding standards regarding discovery, 
motion practice, scheduling, or other topics.280 Building on this theme, 
it has also been suggested that pattern discovery requests might be 
developed for use either on their own or in conjunction with these 
 
pleading stage. Specifically, it is not fully clear to me what a court would do under the IAALS 
proposal if it found that a party had failed to plead its facts with particularity. Proposed Pilot 
Project Rule 2.1 and the accompanying Comment states that a party may plead facts on 
information and belief. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS, supra note 
104, at 3 (“As to facts that are pleaded on information and belief, the pleading party must set 
forth in detail the basis for the information and belief.”). The Comment adds, however, that 
“information and belief” pleading should not be used to evade “the intent of the rule”; rather, 
parties who lack information should resort to Pilot Project Rule 3 to undertake precomplaint 
discovery. Id. But Pilot Project Rule 3.1(b) conditions precomplaint discovery on the judge 
determining that “the moving party has probable cause to believe that the information sought 
by the discovery will enable preparation of a legally sufficient complaint.” Id. at 4. Taking all of 
this together, it is not clear to me what result would obtain if a plaintiff could not plead a 
particular fact and could not persuade the judge that good cause existed for precomplaint 
discovery as to that fact. If the answer is that the complaint would be dismissed, then the 
requirement of fact-based pleading would seem to have force beyond providing additional 
inputs for discovery control and case management. 
 278. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) (“A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading 
to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party 
cannot reasonably prepare a response.”). 
 279. In 2006, before Twombly and Iqbal, the Advisory Committee discussed the idea of 
amending Rule 12(e) as a means of generating additional information for case-management 
purposes. See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., MEETING 
OF SEPTEMBER 7–8, 2006, DRAFT MINUTES 22–24, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV09-2006-min.pdf. Those discussions did not lead to 
any concrete rule proposal then, though it is possible that the subject might resurface should the 
Advisory Committee undertake efforts to revisit pleading standards in the wake of Twombly 
and Iqbal. 
 280. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 404–05 (noting that it would be helpful to judges and 
lawyers to provide norms through suggested standards or protocols for certain types of 
repetitive, time-consuming, and expensive litigation). 
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protocols.281 The pattern requests would streamline discovery because 
parties would know that the requests were not objectionable. On the 
other hand, parties that served discovery beyond the pattern requests 
would, in the event of a particularized objection, bear the burden of 
showing that the discovery was relevant and proportional. These 
types of standardized protocols would not be binding on their own, 
though a judge could make them binding by incorporating them into 
a case-management order. Their principal value, rather, would be in 
setting benchmarks that would guide less-experienced practitioners 
and help inform judges about how best to employ their custom-
tailoring tools, like the proportionality limits under Rule 26(b)(2).282 
Case-management protocols (or pattern discovery protocols) 
might also deliver a valuable secondary benefit—they might help 
lawyers deal with the sometimes unrealistic or even 
counterproductive expectations of their clients. At the January 2009 
meeting of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure, the Committee invited various individuals to participate in 
a Panel Discussion on Problems in Civil Litigation.283 At that 
discussion, several lawyers were asked why protocols were needed 
given that lawyers could already achieve the same outcome by 
cooperation and agreement. One answer was that a restrained and 
sensible approach would be easier to justify to their clients if it came 
from a court-sponsored and generally applicable protocol. In other 
words, the protocols would provide “cover” to the lawyers who 
followed them.284 
The idea of subject-specific, lawyer-developed protocols is worth 
a close look. It was raised at the January 2009 meeting of the Standing 
 
 281. See Joseph Garrison, A Proposal to Implement a Cost-Effective and Efficient 
Procedural Tool into Federal Litigation Practice (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the Duke Law Journal) (suggesting that courts adopt pattern interrogatories, pattern requests to 
produce documents, and a pattern protective order in cases that routinely appear in federal 
courts). 
 282. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 405 (stating that substance-specific protocols “would aid 
lawyers in advising their clients, and aid judges, by providing suggested standards to help inform 
their procedural decisions” (footnote omitted)). 
 283. See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
U.S., MEETING OF JANUARY 12–13, 2009, DRAFT MINUTES 32, available at http://www.uscourts
.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ST01-2009.pdf. 
 284. Cf. INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 14 
(“Court-imposed limits provide lawyers with the ‘cover’ they need to practice limited 
discovery.”). 
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Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.285 Professor Subrin 
once again raises the issue in his most recent critique of the 
transsubstantive rules, suggesting protocols (in conjunction with a 
simple-case track) as a way of providing more detailed norms and 
guidance than the current rules provide.286 The IAALS Civil Caseflow 
Management Guidelines also suggest that judges develop subject-
based case-management protocols by “categorizing cases by type in a 
way that would presume a certain level of judicial involvement for 
certain types of cases.”287 Even the British are taking a hard look at 
adding case-management protocols to their pretrial scheme. In his 
recent report on litigation costs, Lord Justice Jackson recommended 
the following: 
In my view, a menu of standard paragraphs for case management 
directions should be prepared for each type of case of common 
occurrence and made available to all district judges both in hard 
copy and online. These standard directions should then be used by 
district judges as their starting point in formulating initial case 
management directions.288 
3. Culture Change.  Structural reforms—like changes to the 
system of notice pleading and liberal discovery, or the addition of 
subject-specific protocols—are not the only types of reforms that 
could be paired with the case-management model to leverage its 
effectiveness. A very different approach might be to leave the case-
management scheme in place but to change how judges and lawyers 
use it. Professor Thomas Rowe, himself a former member of the 
Advisory Committee, has observed that the case-management model 
will inevitably struggle to control costs if lawyers continue to act like 
spoiled children, requiring judges to provide the equivalent of 
constant adult supervision.289 Perhaps this suggests that what we need 
is not new rules but better play. 
 
 285. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, supra note 283, at 36–37. 
 286. See Subrin, supra note 116, at 404–05 (“[S]ubstance-specific protocols may be in order 
for some types of litigation that have been excluded from the simple track. Such protocols 
would be suggestive and not binding, until a judge chose to mandate them or portions of them.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 287. See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 7. 
 288. LORD JUSTICE JACKSON, supra note 11, at 393 (emphasis added). 
 289. See Rowe, supra note 30, at 213 (noting that litigators occasionally require judicial 
“‘adult supervision’” to foster pretrial cooperation). 
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In July 2008, the Sedona Conference released The Sedona 
Conference Cooperation Proclamation (The Cooperation 
Proclamation), launching a campaign to promote cooperative, 
nonadversarial discovery.290 Last fall, the Sedona Conference followed 
up with The Case for Cooperation.291 That document represents the 
second stage of the Sedona Conference’s campaign to promote 
cooperation. It explores the relationship of cooperation to the 
discovery rules and the ethics rules, showing that those rules either 
assume or require certain forms of cooperation.292 Perhaps more 
critically, The Case for Cooperation explores the benefits of 
cooperation for lawyers and clients.293 Too often, lawyers simply 
default to battle mode in discovery, without even considering what 
they are fighting over, why they are fighting, or whether it is in their 
clients’ best interests to fight over that particular item.294 
A sure first step in using culture change to control costs in 
discovery would be simply to get lawyers to abide by their existing 
rules-based and ethical duties. One of the best ways for lawyers to 
control discovery costs is to start talking to each other early. The 
discovery-planning conference required under Rule 26(f) provides an 
ideal, built-in opportunity for the lawyers to do that.295 The Advisory 
Committee note to the 2006 amendment to Rule 26(f) emphasizes the 
importance of early planning to address a wide range of e-discovery 
issues, from preservation to form of production to methods of 
privilege review, in an attempt to control the cost and burden of e-
discovery.296 Yet lawyers still admit that they often do not have 
meaningful Rule 26(f) conferences.297 Lawyers clamor for judges to 
 
 290. The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, 10 
SEDONA CONF. J. 331, 331 (Supp. 2009) (“The Sedona Conference launches a coordinated 
effort to promote cooperation by all parties to the discovery process to achieve the goal of a 
‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’”). 
 291. The Sedona Conference, The Case for Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339 (Supp. 
2009). 
 292. Id. at 345–54; see also Gensler, Bull’s-Eye View, supra note 34, at 365–69 (discussing 
ways in which the Civil Rules impose duties that can be characterized as duties of cooperation). 
 293. The Sedona Conference, supra note 291, at 356–62. 
 294. See Gensler, E-volving Duties, supra note 34, at 555–56 (asserting that lawyers should 
“‘stop and think’” about whether cooperation would serve their clients’ best interests). 
 295. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 296. Id. 26(f) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment. 
 297. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 77, at 15 (noting that more than half of all survey 
respondents admitted that they did not discuss e-discovery at their discovery planning 
conference); see also Grimm & Cabraser, supra note 75, at 9 (“Anecdotal evidence from the 
judges’ perspective indicates that courts seldom receive proposed discovery plans from the 
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take a more active role in case management,298 but if the lawyers do 
not make the effort to know their own case needs, how can they 
expect the judges to enter thoughtful, case-specific case-management 
orders? More to the point, if lawyers want judges to hold the types of 
Rule 16 conferences described by Judge Rosenthal, then they need to 
have laid the groundwork to have that type of detailed 
conversation.299 Perfunctory Rule 26(f) conferences and bare-bones 
Rule 26(f) reports deprive judges of the very information they need in 
order to perform the active case-management functions that lawyers 
seem to crave. 
Fidelity to the text and spirit of Rule 26(g) would also help 
control discovery cost and delay. Added as part of the discovery-
containment package of amendments in 1983, Rule 26(g) requires 
lawyers to provide Rule 11–like certifications for their discovery 
requests and responses.300 Among other things, lawyers must certify 
that their requests are proportional to the needs of the case and that 
their responses—including objections—are warranted and not 
interposed for an improper purpose.301 As Judge Grimm recently 
wrote in Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services Co.,302 lawyers regularly 
violate Rule 26(g) by serving excessive and thoughtlessly broad 
discovery requests and by responding with blanket objections.303 In 
effect, lawyers look to judicial case management (including through 
discovery motions) to perform the type of case customization that 
Rule 26(g) requires them to perform. To be sure, judges will always 
be needed to resolve legitimate discovery disputes. But there would 
be far fewer discovery disputes, and the issues they raised would be 
much more focused, if lawyers abided by their duties under Rule 
26(g) and stopped taking a blunderbuss approach to discovery. 
If culture change is to complement judicial case management, 
however, it cannot stop with fidelity to the rules. The greatest gains 
may depend on getting lawyers and clients to appreciate that 
 
parties that reflect meaningful efforts to drill down on the issues they are supposed to discuss at 
the Rule 26(f) conference.”). 
 298. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 299. See Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 241 (suggesting that district judges require lawyers to 
be present for Rule 16 conferences and engage in a genuine exchange about the case). 
 300. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g). 
 301. Id. 
 302. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008). 
 303. Id. at 362. For more from Judge Grimm on what lawyers must do (and stop doing) to 
comply with Rule 26(g), see Grimm & Cabraser, supra note 75, at 11–14. 
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cooperation can, at times, be the better litigation strategy.304 Real 
culture change will arrive when clients expect their lawyers to make 
thoughtful decisions about when to cooperate and when to fight in 
discovery. Real culture change will take hold when lawyers, backed by 
their clients, view their rules-based obligations, their ethical 
obligations, and their strategic choices as part of an integrated process 
that works most effectively when the lawyers talk to each other, 
cooperate to reach agreement when possible, and pick their fights 
more thoughtfully and selectively.305 Lawyers say that they would 
prefer “rifle shot” discovery to discovery by “carpet-bombing.”306 
Defaulting to battle mode will not get us there. But if those lawyers 
“learned to work together—by communicating and by developing 
agreed plans that took an iterative approach—then they would be in a 
much better position to trade in their cannon for rifles.”307 
The Cooperation Proclamation views cooperation as a necessary 
adjunct to the case-management model.308 Our system leaves the 
development of the facts in the hands of the parties. Despite claims 
by some that it is preferable to put fact development in the hands of 
the judge,309 there does not appear to be any serious push to move to a 
civil law inquisitorial system. Lawyers still seem to want to be the 
ones driving discovery. But the reality is that, given the current 
structure of the rules, even the best judicial case managers cannot 
fulfill that role if the parties insist on fighting over everything they 
could possibly fight about. One need look no further than the 2006 e-
 
 304. See Grimm & Cabraser, supra note 75, at 18 (“The challenge is to convince clients that 
it is in their economic interest to cooperate with the adverse party to reduce costs so as to focus 
on what really matters.”). 
 305. See Gensler, Bull’s-Eye View, supra note 34, at 370–72 (describing a method of 
discovery in which parties work together and pursue a discovery process based on reason and 
efficiency). 
 306. Id. at 372. 
 307. Id. 
 308. The IAALS also endorses cooperation as a means of discovery-cost control. See INST. 
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 14 (“Cooperation between 
counsel can greatly reduce the cost and time associated with discovery.”). 
 309. See, e.g., John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 823, 824 (1985) (asserting that the West German civil procedure system’s requirement that 
judges rather than lawyers investigate facts is better than the United States’ civil procedure 
system). 
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discovery amendments to find an expression of the sense that judges 
alone cannot manage all of the problems posed by e-discovery.310 
In the end, how one feels about the prospects of the case-
management model to address cost and delay issues may depend in 
large part on whether one thinks that the litigants and their lawyers—
or as Professor Rowe once called them, “the adversarial scorpions in 
[the] litigation bottle”—can find ways to cooperate with each other 
and the judge.311 Perhaps it is true that the rules are just fine—that all 
we need is better play. In that event, case management can proceed 
without significant structural reforms. Recent survey results suggest 
that lawyers are beginning to realize that they can cooperate and still 
be zealous advocates, and that they are already capturing some of the 
benefits of cooperation.312 Cooperation skeptics, however, would 
argue that the cooperative ideal is unrealistic because lawyers and 
clients will continue to view it as advantageous to demand everything 
and produce little.313 If that is true, then we are effectively left, at best, 
with Professor Rowe’s spoiled children in need of constant “‘adult 
supervision,’” and at worst with his “adversarial scorpions in [the] 
litigation bottle.”314 In that event, the case-management model may 
well need to be paired with something else—perhaps significant 
structural reforms—if it is to succeed. 
E. Should Judges “Manage Up” or “Manage Down”? 
In this last Section, I return to the question of how “big” or 
“small” the Civil Rules should be. Section B.2 considered proposals 
to have multiple sets of rules based on the size of the case, either by a 
tracking system with multiple tracks or by creating a set of simplified 
rules for simple cases. In this Section, I assume that the system will 
continue to be transsubstantive and uniform—that is, that there will 
 
 310. See Gensler, E-volving Duties, supra note 34, at 535 (“The 2006 version of Rule 26(f) 
still contemplates a strong role for judicial case management, but . . . it is directed as much, if 
not more, at the party level.”). 
 311. Rowe, supra note 30, at 213 (“[Pretrial managerial judging] requires that the 
adversarial scorpions in their litigation bottle seek ways to cooperate, at least as to pretrial 
procedural management, with each other and the judge.”). 
 312. See ABA SECTION OF LITIG., supra note 78, at 139 (noting that 95 percent of attorneys 
surveyed agreed that a case costs less when all counsel are collaborative and professional); LEE 
& WILLGING, supra note 77, at 31, 63. 
 313. See Stancil, supra note 256, at 99 (“The adversary system . . . understandably magnifies 
the impact of systemic distrust between the parties.”). 
 314. Rowe, supra note 30, at 213. 
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continue to be one set of rules for all cases. The task that remains is to 
determine what the default dimensions of that single set of rules 
should be. 
Roughly speaking, there are three possible targets for the size of 
the rules. We can write rules that target the larger cases, we can write 
rules that target the middle cases, or we can write rules that target the 
smaller cases. The choice determines the direction in which trial 
judges depart by case management. If the rules are written for “big 
cases,” judges must “manage down” in cases that are not big. If the 
rules are written for “small cases,” judges must “manage up” in all of 
the cases that are not small. If the rules are written for the middle 
range of cases, then judges may need to manage either up or down 
depending on the circumstances. 
Within the rulemaking community, there is probably a general 
sense that the Civil Rules are targeted for the middle range of cases.315 
In 2000, the scope of discovery was redefined according to relevance 
to the parties’ claims and defenses, subject to expanding discovery to 
subject-matter relevance upon a showing of good cause and to 
limiting discovery based on proportionality.316 Some might view that 
as seeking to chart a middle course. In 1993, presumptive limits were 
placed on the number of depositions that could be taken and the 
number of interrogatories that could be served.317 Here too, the court 
can adjust upward or downward.318 That also might be seen as seeking 
to chart a middle course.319 
 
 315. See Cooper, supra note 178, at 1800 (“It has been common to wonder whether the 
inevitable compromises have produced rules that work well for most litigation in the middle 
range, but do not work as well for cases at the extremes.”). 
 316. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) & advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment. 
 317. Id. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) & advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment; id. 33(a)(1) & 
advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
 318. See id. 26(b)(2) (“[T]he court may alter the limits in these rules on the number of 
depositions and interrogatories . . . .”); id. 30(a)(2) (requiring a party to obtain leave of the 
court, and the court to grant leave to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(2), if a deposition 
would result in more than ten depositions being taken under Rule 31); id. 33(a)(1) (“Leave to 
serve additional interrogatories may be granted to the extent consistent with Rule 26(b)(2).”). 
 319. The suggestion has often been made that there should be a similar presumptive limit on 
the number of document requests that may be served under Rule 34. A variation on that theme, 
inspired by the growing importance of e-discovery, is that there should be a presumptive limit 
on the number of sources that a party can be required to search. These proposals warrant 
serious consideration. It may be that, in the absence of presumptive limits, the 1970 amendment 
that allowed parties to serve document requests directly without seeking leave of the court and 
showing good cause upended the balance. See id. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1970 
amendment. 
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But not everyone would agree that the Civil Rules have in fact 
hit the center. Professor Subrin, for example, has hypothesized that 
perhaps 5 to 15 percent of civil cases are complex enough to warrant 
active judicial case management.320 He suggests that the standard rules 
are simply too big and costly for most cases. His proposed remedy is 
to have simplified standard rules with detailed pleading, mandatory 
disclosures, reduced discovery, little or no case management, and firm 
trial dates.321 In those cases in which active case management is 
needed, the court could move the case into a “complex rules” mode.322 
The IAALS Pilot Project Rules323 share the view that the existing 
Civil Rules create a default structure that is too big and costly. Like 
Professor Subrin’s proposal, the Pilot Project Rules provide for 
detailed pleading, mandatory disclosures, and limited discovery.324 
Unlike Professor Subrin’s proposal, the Pilot Project Rules still call 
for active case management.325 What is most important, though, is that 
the animating principle of the Pilot Project Rules is to re-set the 
“standard” track of procedure to a set of simplified rules. Indeed, the 
Comment to Pilot Project Rule 1 criticizes the Civil Rules as 
establishing the “notion that parties are entitled to discover all facts, 
without limit, unless and until a court says otherwise” and adds that, 
therefore, “[i]t is the purpose of these [Rules] that the default be 
changed.”326 
Implicit (if not explicit) in the Subrin and IAALS proposals is 
the idea that, whether intended as such or not, the Civil Rules are in 
fact designed for the most complex cases. Thus, Subrin and the 
IAALS would say that not only are the Civil Rules one size, they are 
Cadillac size. And by providing only Cadillac-size rules for all cases, 
Subrin and the IAALS would say that the Civil Rules drive up cost 
and delay by turning small cases into big ones. This occurs because 
the presumption is that all cases will be litigated as big cases until the 
 
 320. See Subrin, supra note 213, at 177. 
 321. Id. at 176; see also Subrin, supra note 116, at 398–405 (proposing a “simple track” for 
cases that generally do not involve the full array of federal procedure); Subrin, supra note 92, at 
45–46 (“[W]e should provide a more constricted presumptive amount of discovery and a short 
period to a certain trial date in the vast majority of cases.”). 
 322. See Subrin, supra note 213, at 177 (“[T]here is a subset of complex cases . . . that will 
require active judicial case management and should not be subject to severe limitations on 
discovery.”). 
 323. IAALS, supra note 103.  
 324. Id. at 3–4. 
 325. See id. at 5–7 (detailing the rules for governing pretrial conferences). 
 326. Id. at 2 (commenting on Rule 1.2). 
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judge manages the case down to its appropriate size, an occurrence 
which critics say rarely happens.327 The remedy, they say, is to flip the 
default and adopt Chevy-size rules for all cases, leaving it to the judge 
to manage the case up to its appropriate size. 
Two things are undeniably true. The first is that, if we are going 
to have a single set of rules for all cases, we must make—we cannot 
help but make—a choice about where to set the default. The second 
is that the location of that default will determine how judges manage. 
Do they manage up, manage down, or manage from the middle? I 
take very seriously the notion that we should pick the right default. 
But does the current system fail to do that? 
I understand the critics of the current system to make two claims. 
The first is that the default limits for discovery should be reduced 
because many litigants view the limits not as a flexible cap, as they 
were intended, but as a target pinpointing the appropriate amount of 
discovery to be taken.328 This claim views discovery as having the 
defining characteristics of a gas—that is, it has no definite shape and 
will expand to fill the size of its container. Thus, if the scope of 
discovery is X, then the parties will take discovery to reach the limits 
of X. Similarly, if the default rules allow ten depositions, then the 
lawyers will reflexively take ten depositions whether they need them 
or not, and so on. The second claim is that, for various strategic and 
tactical reasons, lawyers are making deliberate choices to seek more 
discovery than they need.329 
Lowering the default levels of discovery would respond to the 
first claim. By shrinking the size of the container, the gas—
discovery—would contract accordingly.330 What may be needed, 
 
 327. Id. (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and many state rules already contain factors 
that—where applied—address proportionality in discovery. However, these factors are rarely if 
ever applied . . . .”). 
 328. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. 
LEGAL SYS., supra note 80, at 7 (“Unfortunately, many lawyers believe that they should—or 
must—take advantage of the full range of discovery options offered by the rules. They believe 
that zealous advocacy (or fear of malpractice claims) demands no less and the current rules 
certainly do not dissuade them from that view.”); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. 
LEGAL SYS., supra note 11, at 14 (“[M]any lawyers are hesitant to limit the scope and tools of 
discovery on their own accord, based in part on fears of malpractice claims.”). 
 329. See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil 
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549, 570–72, 594–96 (2010) (noting that attorneys use the 
discovery system, including e-discovery, to burden opponents with costly information requests 
and to force settlement). 
 330. Note, however, that Boyle’s Law holds that the volume and pressure of a gas are 
inversely proportional assuming a constant temperature. One necessary corollary of Boyle’s 
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though, is empirical proof that discovery actually does exhibit the 
physical properties of a gas. Rule 33 presumptively allows each party 
to serve twenty-five interrogatories on any other party.331 If discovery 
expands to the size of its container, we should expect each party to 
serve their full quota of interrogatories in every case. Yet the data 
from the latest FJC survey found that over 20 percent of plaintiffs and 
defendants served no interrogatories at all.332 Similarly, Rule 30 
presumptively allows each side ten depositions.333 Yet nearly half of 
the respondents to the recent FJC survey reported taking no 
nonexpert depositions.334 And in the cases in which nonexpert 
depositions were taken, the average taken was 3.8 for plaintiffs and 
2.8 for defendants, well below the ten per side we would expect to 
find if lawyers were reflexively taking as much discovery as the rules 
allowed.335 
As to the second claim, it is open to question whether lowering 
the default level of discovery would make much of a difference. 
Presumably, litigants motivated by strategic gains would continue to 
seek those gains. For those litigants, a reform that flips the default to 
require motions for permission to take discovery might simply end up 
substituting “motions to enlarge” for “motions to limit.” Moreover, 
there is good reason to think that opportunistic behavior in discovery 
is a two-way street. Lowering the default limits would do little to 
respond to the complaint that producing parties also engage in 
discovery abuse for strategic gain.336 
What we need is to find the right balance—a default standard 
that is neither overly generous nor overly restrictive. That, I think, 
augurs for targeting the middle. I leave it to readers to decide 
 
Law is that, if you shrink the size of the container, you increase the pressure the gas exerts on 
the walls of the container unless you find a way to take heat out of the system at the same time. 
 331. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1). 
 332. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 77, at 9. The survey did not track the number of 
interrogatories served in those cases in which they were used. 
 333. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i) (stating that a party must obtain leave of the court if 
a deposition would result in more than ten depositions being taken). 
 334. LEE & WILLGING, supra note 77, at 10. Expert depositions were a comparative rarity, 
with fewer than one in seven respondents reporting taking them in their closed cases. Id. at 9. 
 335. Id. at 10. 
 336. Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Uncovering Discovery 5–6 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://civilconference.uscourts.gov/LotusQuickr/dcc/Main.nsf/$defaultview/12C00D7
5EEE2711D8525764800454561/$File/Elizabeth Cabraser, Uncovering Discovery.pdf. 
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whether the current Civil Rules hit that target.337 And if we are off 
target, I also urge readers to consider whether the reform proposals 
being circulated would put us in the middle or simply skew the 
imbalance in a different direction. It may be that we need to correct 
course in some fashion. But if we do that, we must be careful not to 
oversteer. 
CONCLUSION 
For nearly thirty years, the Civil Rules have looked to judicial 
case management as the principal means for controlling excessive cost 
and delay in civil cases. Trial court judges have broad managerial 
powers, particularly in defining the contours of discovery. We expect 
trial court judges to use those powers aggressively, to take control of 
cases early on, and to head off problems before they have a chance to 
occur. Trial judges are consistently told that the best way to control 
cost and delay is to intervene early, before things get out of hand. 
Case management is the proverbial ounce of prevention. 
Some, though, see case management as a cure worse than the 
disease. Critics lament the role that case management has played in 
the decline of trials and the shrinking pool of trial lawyers. They 
express concern about how case-management decisions are opaque, 
standardless, and unreviewable, heightening the risk that judges will 
abuse their power. They see case management itself as a symptom of 
a larger and more foundational flaw in the Civil Rules—the fact that 
the rules are one-size-fits-all. They urge that what we need is not 
more case management but new sets of rules that apply to different 
categories of cases; being tailored to the needs of the cases in those 
categories, these rules would not require so much ad hoc 
customization by judges. They worry that case management is 
inherently flawed in that it requires judges to make rational decisions 
in contexts in which they lack sufficient data, leaving them at risk of 
substituting their own biases. 
 
 337. If the results from the FJC’s Civil Rules survey are an accurate indication, the Civil 
Rules may already strike the right balance. Survey respondents generally thought that the 
amount of discovery under the Civil Rules was more or less right given the characteristics of the 
case. See LEE & WILLGING, supra note 77, at 27–28. Also, survey respondents generally thought 
that the Civil Rules had about the right amount of case management. Id. at 67. It is certainly 
true, however, that some of the other empirical studies do not evidence that level of satisfaction 
with discovery or with existing norms of judicial case management. 
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Others see case management as an important part of the puzzle 
but insufficient by itself. They urge that the case-management scheme 
be joined to other types of reforms to make it work effectively. Some 
proposals would alter the structure of the existing rules scheme, such 
as by altering the pleading requirements. Others would augment the 
existing scheme with subject-specific protocols developed by the bar. 
Still others would leave the existing scheme as it is but get it to work 
better by changing the culture of adversarial discovery. 
Rulemakers and outside reformers alike must appreciate that 
case-management reform is not just a function of finding better case-
management techniques or even of getting the relevant actors to use 
the existing techniques more effectively. Case-management reform 
necessarily entails revisiting the policy choices that underlie our 
reliance on case management. How should judges be spending their 
time? Does it still make sense to have (generally) one set of rules that 
applies to all cases? Are we comfortable with the amount of 
discretion that such a system necessarily must give to trial judges for it 
to work? Would we be better off with multiple sets of rules, perhaps 
for different subjects or for cases of different sizes? If we are going to 
have just one set of rules, should we downsize those rules and require 
judges to manage up instead of, as some perceive the current 
situation, having rules built for the most complex cases such that 
judges must manage down in the simple cases? The choices we 
eventually make regarding how best to utilize case management must 
ultimately depend on the degree to which we continue to believe that 
the benefits of a system that relies on judicial case management 
outweigh the costs. 
